FAITH AND REALITY

J. HILTON STOWELL, M.A., D.D.

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BY

J. HILTON STOWELL, M.A., D.D.

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"I am in the Father, and the Father in Me."
JOHN xiv. 10.

"I should know what God and man is."
TENNYSON.

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CONTENTS

I

INTRODUCTION

PAGES

Inadequate objectivity in religion—Indefiniteness is not unreality—Personality is constructive of reality and is sustained by the movement of faith—Religion is an evolution of Divine personality in human life—A philosophy of Spirit passes over into religion - - - - - 7—11

II

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAITH AS AN ACT

The subjective side—Faith as cognition : as indefinite in scope it is less, but as basal source it is more, than science—It is a knowledge of God, a normal function—Faith as trust : at once the ideal and the effort of the good-will—Faith as self-surrender : obedience to God and effort at union with Him 12—26

III

THE CONTENTS OF FAITH AS AN EXPERIENCE

The objective side—God and the eternal world—A Highest and Best is immanent in faith—Man greater than he knows—Experience of God in all religions—Christianity the central and continuous development—The Christian faith : revelation, redemption, the religious life, the Church, immortality - - - - - - 27—74

IV

THE CHALLENGE OF FAITH AS A TRUTH

PAGES

The mind's prerogative—Excess or defect in the act will modify the experience—Systems which would eliminate faith: scepticism, agnosticism, ethicism, naturalism, positivism, materialism, pantheism—They fail because they imply the principle that they challenge, thus contradicting themselves - - - - - - 75—106

V

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH AS A VITAL NECESSITY

For the solution of ultimate problems faith widens, not narrows, the basis—This is illustrated in recent theories: pragmatism, value-judgments, activism, intuitionism - - - - - 107—131

VI

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH AS A VITAL NECESSITY—*Continued*

The idea of God is found indispensable in philosophy and ethics: the three proofs - - 132—147

VII

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH AS A VITAL NECESSITY—*Continued*

Religion offers to reality a complete interpretation - - - - - - 148—165

VIII

CONCLUSION - - - - - 166—168

FAITH AND REALITY

I

INTRODUCTION

Inadequate objectivity in religion—Indefiniteness is not necessarily unreality—Personality is constructive of reality and is sustained by the movement of faith—Religion is an evolution of Divine personality in human life—A philosophy of Spirit passes over into religion.

RELIGION is a universal human experience, yet as a distinct element in consciousness it is liable to aberration and weakening, such as may amount virtually to its disappearance. Prominent among modern forms of this departure from its normal movement is what may be described as an inadequate objectivity, a lack of reality in the spiritual things as compared with the objects of other parts of our experience. Religious faith, although essentially the same as other kinds of faith, has come in some quarters to be reckoned an almost purely subjective phenomenon, and that is, as truth, almost nothing at all. The conception of what constitutes knowledge has been sharpened

up to such definiteness for the purpose of the inductive sciences that the indefinite has come to be identified with the unknown, and the unknown with the practically non-existent. Yet it is both correct and convenient to retain for the term "knowledge" a connotation that includes actual, though indefinite, elements of our conscious life. There is much of our life which, although it eludes the definiteness of a fully objective demonstration, belongs unquestionably to the realm of the real and the known. In particular the object of religious faith has inevitably an indefiniteness, and yet it exhibits a reality both rational and practical. Not only is there reality in that which is believed, but there is normal and even necessary movement of the mind in the act of believing. Faith, in other words, is not an illusion or immaturity of the mind, but is an essential element, both subjectively and objectively, in the approach to reality. The principle which is specially at work in religion is also the positive and ultimate element in all knowledge and in all goodness whatsoever; and for reflective thought God becomes at least as real an object for man as man is for himself. The point of view is that of an absolute personalism. Finite persons live, move, and have their being, only in their relationship to the Absolute Person. This relationship is the constructive principle of all

reality, and is sustained by the movement of faith.

The unity of God and man is a central idea in Christian doctrine, yet while intuitive and emotional processes have apprehended this unity, theology has not been fully successful in defining it without falling back on these non-intellectual or sub-intellectual forms. The effort to find adequate intellectual expression for this unity should not be abandoned, or at least it should be made clear that any alternative spiritual expression which is reckoned adequate is in no way less, but in some way more, adequate than the purely intellectual. We should ask of philosophy, that it set forth the reality of God as Thought; of ethics, that it set forth God as practical life or Character; and of theology, that it shall include the full scope of these two, and add to them a still higher category of reality, setting forth God as Personal Spirit exhibited in and through the spirit of man.*

Faith really enters at each stage of the developing consciousness. It is something more than an element in knowledge and more than an element in conduct. It is an active principle in the main problem of which philosophy and ethics are only particular applications. Philosophy speaks in

* *Cf.* John xiv. 6: "Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, and the truth, and the life."

terms of pure thought, its aim being the unity of thought with itself. Ethics speaks in terms of thought and volition combined, its aim being the unity of thought with action. Religion speaks in terms of thought, volition, and spirit combined. It deals with the ultimate and inclusive reality. It presents the unity of thought and conduct as a process of the perfecting of man. Its aim is an evolution of Divine personality in human life.

Is there an objective apprehension of God in human thought? Have we a knowledge of God on the same lines as our knowledge of other reality? To establish an affirmative answer to this question has been the task of theistic philosophy. God has been sought, and has been found, and has with some success been displayed, as the Unity underlying all our thought, and giving to our thought its validity. Such a Unity, however, even when rationally and finally established, is as yet a unity only for thought. It does not dissipate the practical dualism of the human will. To do that is a problem reserved for Ethics. Nor does it solve the mystery of personality. This unfolds fully only in the higher category of Spirit. Yet Thought has not failed altogether within the limits of its proper task. The incurable dualism of metaphysics, which is felt even in respect of the Hegelian Absolute, arises only as

Philosophy pushes "beyond her mark." And if Hegel's Absolute be taken simply as the equivalent of Thought, it must be admitted that he rests upon the unity of Thought more than that basis can sustain. But if it be rightly understood as something more than an abstraction, and as equivalent to the unity of religious intuition, the Hegelian Absolute Spirit offers an intellectual construction of the reality of the object of faith.

In the sphere of thought Spirit has its elucidating, rationalizing movement; but in volition and emotion Spirit has other movements alongside the movement of Thought. For its own purpose Philosophy represents action and feeling as merely immature or implicit phases of truth, which it is for Thought to mature and render explicit. But this representation must not be taken as exhausting the spiritual content of life. A philosophy of Spirit is thus more than a philosophy in the narrower sense of the word. It passes over into the fully personal realm of religion. The term "Spirit" indicates an advance towards the Christian conception of Love, in the sense in which absolute Love is God.

II

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAITH AS AN ACT

The subjective side—Faith as cognition: As indefinite in scope it is less, but as basal source it is more, than science—It is a knowledge of God, a normal function—Faith as trust: at once the ideal and the effort of the good-will—Faith as self-surrender: obedience to God and effort at union with Him.

FAITH is an act. Whatever else it may be, it is at least on the subjective side a conscious, responsible movement on our part, one in which the whole personality participates and one which thus presents a normal problem in psychology. It is a movement of our cognitive faculties. The relation of belief to knowledge has been described as that of being less than knowledge, and yet, at the same time, the basis of knowledge.* But is it really the less here that sustains the greater? Is the pyramid of knowledge resting on its apex? As the basis apart from which knowledge cannot stand there is to be recognized in belief something that although undeveloped in its form is essentially not less than knowledge. The postulate of the uniformity of

* G. Croom Robertson, "Elements of General Philosophy," p. 92.

nature, which the mind holds by faith, is not rightly classed as "inadequate knowledge" if we are actually using it as the criterion of adequacy in whatever knowledge science has. A principal which gives security cannot be less secure than that to which it gives a guarantee. A basis should be at least as secure as that which it supports, or else be rejected. So faith is a true act of knowledge.

A distinction, of course, remains between the knowledge which is by faith prior to the testing of experience and the knowledge which has been fully verified by experience. Inductive science has its well-defined sphere. Yet the distinction must not be pressed so far as to deny that even fully verified experience has still within itself an element of faith. And it must not be assumed that fully verified experience is the only or the highest form of knowledge. The poet's highest knowledge is his vision. This is easily to be distinguished from the poem into which he "beats his music out." The definite form into which he puts his thought makes it available for other minds, and has its own distinct advantages; but it is not in every respect superior to his vision, and in some respects must inevitably fall below it.

> "Sweet is the exultance of song, but the strain that precedes it is sweeter;
> And never was poem yet writ but the meaning out-mastered the metre."

Browning demands recognition for the human potentialities that have a place in consciousness without ever issuing into overt experience:

> "Thoughts hardly to be packed
> Into a narrow act,
> Fancies that broke through language and escaped;
> All I could never be,
> All, men ignored in me,
> This, I was worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped."

And the strictest inductive science for its own advance must look to its inner possibilities, through fertility in hypothesis, through flashes of deductive insight, suggesting new lines of induction. It must remember the hole of the pit whence it was digged. The quarry is greater, not less, than the stones chiselled out from it. Faith is not a child of knowledge, but a progenitor whose nature is transmitted through all its descendants. The cognitive impulse of faith which appears in the wonder, the guesses, and desires in which men begin their experimenting as well as their praying, persists to the end in the ambitions, the hopes, and the dreams which spur men of the present day to their highest endeavours.

There is a sense in which God as the ultimate object of knowledge is interwoven with human consciousness at its earliest stage, though in a vague and implicit way; and advance comes through the

willing recognition of Him by faith, as delay or retrogression arises by neglect or denial of Him. From this point of view the Apostle Paul ascribes human degeneracy to men refusing "to have God in their knowledge" (Rom. i. 28). The sin of man is unfaithfulness. "A man can always, if he does not darken his eyes by unfaithfulness, get enough truth to live by." The light of the world for advance in character and in civilization has always been a light of faith. It is ancient Chinese doctrine that "man is born for uprightness." The Japanese have a high doctrine of human nature as good. It was faith that directed the Stoic: "Be true to nature; follow reason and the good life." "To thine own self be true." The principle of the highest and best for man is entirely a postulate of faith, and yet it constitutes a working reality which man must "have in his knowledge," or his entire nature degenerates.

But still this scarcely escapes from leaving the act shut up within its own subjectivity, so that all that the self really knows by faith is self, and God is thus merely to each man his own Higher Self. It must be further made clear that the act not simply constitutes or brings its own object, but is itself a response to stimulus from an object other than itself. Religion implies revelation of another and a Higher than self, Who is revealing Himself to,

as well as in, the soul of man. The assurance of the reality of this other than self is found in the sense of littleness and failure that religion evokes in the self. The religious ideal brings rebuke to the pettiness of man; it calls the soul to rise to higher levels. Thought, when considering itself in relation to its object, realizes itself to be not supreme, but only and eternally a servant to Truth.

When life pursues its normal, unreflecting course every act of knowledge is an act of faith in Truth. Later, on reflection, through the shocks and surprises of experience, doubt creeps in with regard to the reality of the object. But it now becomes the function of the mind to restore between thought and its object that unity which doubt has disturbed. And the reality of God for the believing soul is found in that He actually humbles, rebukes, inspires, commands, and elevates the believer. The act of faith is thus an act which shows true contact with objectivity. It is no mere refinement of subjectivity. Of course, when the validity and necessity of faith as a normal movement of cognition is admitted, it must still be recognized that vast regions in which faith is at work exhibit only the indolence and superstition which are not merely less than knowledge, but are often its positive foes. Yet even as such they have the form of

knowledge. They are false knowledge, "having a form of godliness but denying the power thereof" (2 Tim. iii. 5). They are, perhaps, the *corruptio optimi pessima*, that corruption of best which is worst; but they are undoubtedly either an activity or a sluggishness of the mind *as knowing*. That faith is a normal function of personality and has full cognitive value remains true notwithstanding that as a function it is liable to miscarriage, degeneracy, and neglect.

A further characteristic of faith is that it is an act of the will. It is not only knowledge but trust. It is a function of the moral as well as of the intellectual nature. All recent psychology has recognized the conative as not simply accompanying, but dominating, the cognitive movement of the mind—that is to say, it is recognized that there is no such thing as a state of consciousness which is not at the same time an act of volition. The movement of knowledge all along is essentially an effort of will. All knowledge is experience, and "experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment"; "experience as the psychologist deals with it, living experience, is primarily and pre-eminently practical."* And faith, as it moves to apprehend its object, moves volitionally to trust the object that it apprehends. And here again,

* Ward, article in "Encyclopædia Britannica."

with the moral ideal of goodness as with the intellectual ideal of truth, we may say that faith as trust in goodness is at once a smaller and a greater virtue than the goodness which is fully exhibited in our experience. There is a righteousness which is by faith, a purifying trust in the moral ideal, a conative impulse, which stands in relation to outward conduct just as the poet's vision stands in relation to his finished poem. It is something less than a fully expressed actuality. It has not the embodied effectiveness required for general serviceableness, yet as a spring and inspiration of conduct this trust in the ideal is a creative reality, and is greater than that which it creates. To recognize God in conduct is to move to obey Him, and though the obedience may be imperfectly achieved, there is in the quality of the impulse something outweighing the sum of all its specific achievements.

Thus, the apprehension of God as truth is not to be separated from the worship of Him as goodness. To believe in Him is also to trust in Him. It can be otherwise only by violence done to the unity of personality. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23), for faith is at once the link with truth and the instrument of man's progress in the expression of truth.

But the cognitive and the conative aspects do not

exhaustively account for personality. Faith finds its fullest subjective expression in religious submission and self-surrender—not, however, as a merely negative movement, but as a condition of its fullest objective realization, in a union with that to which the surrender is made.

"Religion is the surrender of the finite will to the infinite, the abnegation of all desire, inclination, volition, that pertain to me as this private individual self, the giving up of every aim or activity that points only to my exclusive pleasure or interest, the absolute identification of my will with the will of God. Oneness of mind and will with the Divine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning and birth in the soul . . . so that *it is no longer I that live*—not any 'I' that I can claim as my own —*but God that liveth in me.*"*

This involves a synthesis of both the intellectual and the moral faculties in their relation to the Divine Being. Faith in its movement as trust is able effectually to promote not only morals but worship; yet as submission and self-surrender, a still higher phase appears in a completed covenant or union with God. The worship which is simply confidence and effort is still a relation of the soul to Deity conceived as merely external. In the act of self-surrender the relation, while still involving confidence and effort, becomes fully spiritual, at least in the sense that the relation is

* J. Caird, "Philosophy of Religion," p. 296.

now towards a God who is within as well as above the soul.

Even the primitive religions show something of this full movement of religious faith. The early Romans* cherished as highest piety the act of *devotio* by which a citizen voluntarily died for his country, thus entering, as he conceived it, into a sort of union with his country's gods. By his death the nation survived, and he, in some higher way, was identified with its survival. It was thus at the Battle of Vesuvius, 340 B.C., that Decius Mus, "calling the Pontifex Maximus, repeated after him the form of words by which he devoted himself and the army of the enemy to the gods of the dead and the mother earth; then, leaping upon his horse, he rushed into the thickest of the fight and was slain." His son Decius and his grandson did the same in later wars.

There is also the idea of *possession* by the god for the purposes of revelation. Virgil describes it in the sibyl†: "Suddenly her looks change, her colour comes and goes, her locks are dishevelled, her breast heaves, and her fierce heart swells with inspired rage; she appears in larger form, her voice speaking her not a mortal now that she is

* Warde Fowler, "Religious Experience of the Roman People."

† "Æneid," vi., 45-77.

charged with the nearer influence of the god . . . struggling, if possible, to disburden her soul of the mighty god, so much the more he wearies her foaming lips, subduing her ferocious heart, and, by bearing down her opposition, moulds her to his will." F. B. Jevons* gives, among many other instances, those of the Mexican priest-kings, who were treated as the living idols or representatives of the God; and the King of Iddah, saying, "God made me after His own image; I am all the same as God, and He appointed me a King"; and the South American Shaman, "generally by nature a nervous, hysterical subject, easily sent into a trance"; and the Tonga priest, "who has a peculiar or distinct sort of mind or soul, differing from the generality of mankind, which disposes some God occasionally to inspire him." He regards these as showing that the priest is not self-constituted, a mere sorcerer or magician, but that he becomes priest only by becoming inspired and possessed by the God.

The origin of *taboo* as a repellent and protective power surrounding the priest-king, and of *mana* as an inspiring supernatural power, is very obscure. But R. R. Marett† finds in these ideas merely the negative and positive modes of the supernatural or

* "History of Religion," p. 283 ff.
† "Threshold of Religion," p. 127.

mystic power which universally, under a variety of names, is recognized in primitive religion. The one is mystic danger, the other is mystic energy; both implying a power or will greater than man's, and yet such as man may possess and be possessed by. And "Power belongeth unto God." Even these rudimentary experiences of inspiration show their kinship with its highest forms.

And, again, there is the *sacrificial meal* with its implication of unity. Robertson Smith* points out that in the Semitic religion a man was born into a fixed relation to certain Gods, and that religion began not in fear but in loving reverence for Gods known, and knit to their worshippers in kinship. The sacrifice was essentially a social feast emphasising the unity of the tribe, not only among its own members but with its God. The fundamental idea is not tribute to the God, but communion of all with Him by their joint participation in the victim's flesh and blood. This finds further expression in the *covenant* relation in which the people are peculiarly God's people, and He their God. The movement which begins as an external relation to the Divine tends to establish itself as a full spiritual relation in which, in respect of man, the Divine is immanent as well as transcendent.

* "Religion of Semites."

And here again the peculiar difference between faith and experience shows itself. The spiritual submission in which the soul unites itself with God is at once less than, and greater than, the actuality of experience. Whatever effective reality belongs to the *devotio*, *possession*, *taboo*, *mana*, *covenant*, it falls very far short in fact of all that is claimed for it or implied by it. The medicine-man, the priest, the devotee, the mystic are rather symbols than instances of spiritual union between man and God. They illustrate the idea and the effort, but in varying degrees; and also they show a failure in fact. Doubtless it may be claimed that there is some degree of reality in the movement of the spirit by these modes into a fellowship with God. But very easily and very largely the purely formal character of the official attitude preponderates over the spiritual achievement. The taunt "Where is thy God?" has always been levelled successfully against the devout because their implied claim of a union with God has never been completely verified in outward experience. Yet this mighty impulse in man towards something that is to be, this effort at a union with God, is the inner spring of all upward movement that has been experienced towards a perfect life, and it contains promise and potency of more. It is actually man's greatest experience, and in a sense is a complete experience,

though infinitely inexhaustible. Broadly speaking, religion has developed *pari passu* with civilization. But in vision and impulse it has always at its best been ahead of civilization. It has been a vivifying atmosphere from which man's advancing ideals and policies have drawn their vigour.

Moreover, this act of full submission in which faith unites the soul with its object, while it works for manifestation in a completed outward order of things, also passes beyond this order, and is not to be estimated entirely in the terms of outward success. There is for faith a victory over the world which consists even more in completing a spiritual process through opposition and failure than in the immediate securing of perfect physical and temporal conditions. The great saints and heroes "all died in faith, not having received the promises" (Heb. xi. 13). And still we have to die in faith. Death itself is the last enemy, to be destroyed as Christ destroyed it, by dying, by going through with it in the spirit of life which is the Spirit of God. Spiritual experience is something less than an empirically realized ideal; but it is also something more than any total of completed achievements in space and time. The æsthetic argument indicates this. Plato's perception of a Divine beauty, of which earthly beauties are but fleeting glimpses, corre-

sponds to this spiritual apprehension of a perfection which does not, and perhaps can never, get full expression on earth. Faith as the feeling for the beautiful is at once more than pure emotion and more than a perception of beauty, it is a union of the "beautiful soul" with the Divine whose indwelling presence makes the soul beautiful. Its symbol in Christianity, indeed, has reached, in the Cross, a form that Plato would hardly have understood. The defect of mysticism is not that by self-surrender it aims at union with God, but that, through failing to hold firmly the soul's distinction from God, it fails to reach a true union, reaching only the illusion of ideality. It tries "to approach the infinite by turning its back upon the finite, and not by seeking more thoroughly to understand the finite. Hence the mystics supposed that the highest idea—that which comes closest to the truth of things—must necessarily be that which has least content; and they treated pure being, the simplest of all abstractions, as representing something more real than is to be found in any specific form of existence."* So Mysticism perceives the soul's need of God, but not sufficiently that God needs the soul *as He has made it*, namely, distinct from Himself. The distinction is to be surmounted, but not destroyed.

* Edward Caird, "The Evolution of Religion," i. 148.

The movement of faith is in all its phases a distinct submission, and though in its highest phase as religious experience, it is the entire personality that submits, the union which is thus achieved with God is a real experience in which the differences do not hinder, but enrich the Unity.

III

THE CONTENTS OF FAITH AS AN EXPERIENCE

The objective side—God and the eternal world—A Highest and Best is immanent in faith—Man greater than he knows—Experience of God in all religions—Christianity the central and continuous development—The Christian Faith: revelation, redemption, the religious life, the Church, immortality.

THERE is an objective side to faith. It is subjectively an act, but it is an act that brings its own object. We ask not only how faith moves in us as a psychological process, but what it brings with it, what it contributes to the total reality of experience as objective. It is a problem in ontology.

Now while faith begins by entering more or less consciously as a constituent factor into all knowledge at the *causal nexus*, and, further, is found entering into all conduct with the moral principle, it finally reaches its fully conscious and deliberate form as religion; and there it defines its contribution as God, the eternal world, and our spiritual relations with these. Although these objectivities are not at first recognized as primary

and fundamental they gradually come to be the paramount interests, the abiding realities from which ordinary experience derives all its significance and security. Faith, which is at bottom the almost unconscious link between the visible world and our intelligence, and constitutes the almost involuntary yet active grasp by which we hold our possession of the world, is also and in itself specifically the "substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Heb. xi. 1). A man may refrain from any open profession of religion; and yet if he were totally to exclude the function of faith from the operation of his intelligence he would reduce his mind to insanity; if he were to cease from the working of faith in conduct, he would become imbecile. On the other hand, if he will unfold the positive implication of faith and accept its contribution to experience, he must become definitely religious.

The objective implication from the beginning is a superlative. However vague may be the object which religious faith grasps, it is grasped as something which is reckoned to be in some way superior to all other things. Thus in normal religion we find a process working to adjust man's relationship towards something Highest and Best. It is true that, in the almost latent condition of the faith, which is constitutive of merely intellectual

knowledge, there is generally less than this at work; and, indeed, there is a tendency to remain content with self as the highest and best reality! But if faith be given its distinct and full function as constitutive also of experience through character and aspiration, it asserts at once in some form a "Higher Power," a greater than self, and religion develops. The act of man in recognizing the Power, trusting the Power, entering into relations with the Power, brings out the objective contents of the Power. Truly seeking God, man begins to find Him; though in a way man necessarily begins, at the outset, in possession of that which he seeks. There is a fallacy in the dilemma of "Which was first, the hen or the egg?" The hen is the egg hatched, as the egg is the hen unhatched. It is one mystery, not two. So in regard to the relation between God and man, we must avoid an initial dualism of asking how could man act towards a Higher Power before he knew the nature of that Power, or how could the nature of that Power be known to him before he had acted, and so had brought into experience some actual relations with it? It is not a double problem, but the one central mystery of life. "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God" (John vii. 17). "He that cometh to God must believe that He is,

and that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him" (Heb. xi. 6). The paradox is only the paradox of growth, or of evolution. When a man is willing to seek after the highest and best his faith leads him instantly "above himself," and begins the unfolding of a treasure which while his, and even part of himself, so to speak, is also beyond him and greater than himself. Faith, while it is man's faculty for recognizing truth, trusting goodness, and aspiring to union with these, is also itself their creative, or at least producing, agency. As an immediate problem the question: "Which was first, man or God?" would be a futility; for man finds God in himself, as the ultimate explanation of himself; and what God is can be unfolded to man only through what man is. "Man is not man as yet," it has been said. And still more obviously man is not God as yet. But man finds God in Himself in such reality as carries with it relative divinity for self. "Now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is" (1 John iii. 2).

This is the objective reality which faith contributes to experience. And if this contribution has come along the lines of evolution gradually, yet at all stages it has been something more than the

evolution of man. It is not, however, to be described as in any sense the evolution of God, for such a phrase is a contradiction in terms. It has been an evolution of man's experience of God, in which God has been present always as something greater than man. God has been transcendent while immanent. Man's experience of God has included always a large potential element alongside the relatively small actual consciousness of this relation between the human and the divine.

Whether consciousness of the Higher Power in the earliest traceable phases of the religious consciousness appears under the form of nature-worship, rising as Max Müller suggests from tangible objects such as shells and stones, to semi-tangible such as trees, mountains, and rivers, and finally to the "intangible" clouds and heavenly bodies; or whether under the form of ancestor-worship growing out of dreams and their suggestions of ghosts and spirits of the departed, there is clear implication of something in man's experience which can be recognized as *other* and in some way *greater* than himself. He is conscious of Another Presence which, as he must conceive it located somewhere, he conceives as residing in some of the natural objects about him, or as in the Unseen. The one ultimate reality in his consciousness, moreover, is life, and the primitive man apparently

because of this tends to animism, that is, to regard all natural objects as being alive, or as associated with living spirits. But why should he regard in any case their life as greater than his own? Perhaps because in particular cases their power appears actually greater than his. The flood carries him away, the wind blows him over, a stone falls upon his leg and crushes him; for him the sun bathes the world with light and warmth and the rain clouds pour out their precious drops upon the parched ground; or he feels inspired by the fierceness and skill of ancestors or enemies who are now dead and yet are desired or invoked in worship. But a deeper explanation is that man is greater than he knows. What he regards as a mysterious power greater than himself is in part a projection from within, an objectifying of his own potential greatness. A time comes when that potential becomes largely actual and he can subjugate the flood with dykes, canals, steamships, and submarines; when he can bring against the wind his aeroplanes, and extort from sun and shower their chemical and dynamic secrets. Only, with this explanation there remains to be recognized a potential element not less but larger than ever. Man who has accomplished so much, how shall he not now go on to very much more? It is the objectifying of his potentialities that, in the

end as at the beginning, gives man all leverage for advance. This is man's touch with the Infinite and Eternal in the realm of experience. And in its more personal aspects it means not the gradual disappearance but the increasing growth and intensity of religion along the line of human progress. If spirit-worship and ancestor-worship are in any sense a projection of the potentialities of human character, then the advance to a tribal deity, to a national deity, and again to a supreme and universal deity, implies advance both in the actual level of human personality and in its outlook.

The Positivist classification of progress into three stages, of which the earliest, the theological, is superseded by the metaphysical, and that again by the scientific, does not accord with the facts. The stages are not at all exclusive of one another; the earliest persists in, and even develops along with, the latest. Comte defines modern religion as the concentration of the three altruistic affections: reverence towards that which is above us, love towards that which helps and sustains us, and benevolence towards that which needs our aid. But to exclude the theistic idea from these is to shut out that objective without which man does not find adequate dynamic for his altruism. Man cannot worship his "larger self"; he cannot even struggle to realize that self, unless he is conscious of a

Higher Reality of which self may become the agent or instrument.

The history of religion is the history of man's growing experience of God. The lowest animistic faiths are not without some occasional recognition of the Supreme Being. The Kaffir prays to God Almighty under the title Unkulunkulu; although the prayer often is little more than "Go away; we don't want you." All the great religions show theistic faith making its contribution to the intelligent and moral development of the race. The ancient Teutonic tribes found in nature's stormy aspects the emblem of deity drawing man on to battle for life and independence. Thor's hammer was their parable of the world's strife and the brave man's effort to dominate and subdue opposition. The Greeks with their kindly climate thought of man as nature's crowning display, and of the gods as but immortal men. The universe appeared as a beautiful, free, personalized, and humanized unity. The prayer of Socrates, according to Plato, was:

"O beloved Pan, and all ye other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful in the inner man; and that whatever outward things I have may be at peace with those within. May I deem the wise man rich, and may I have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can either bear or employ."

Zoroastrianism, again, akin to the Teutonic type, faces conflict, but rather of spiritual than natural forces, laying emphasis on man's freedom and responsibility in maintaining the struggle for good against evil. It is true that in the third part of the Zend Avesta, the Vendidad, "the priestly code of the Parsees," there is some merging of the ceremonial with the moral. There are rigid laws against throwing any defilement into fire, or doing any unclean act in the presence of fire; and there are minute prescriptions as to personal cleanliness. Yet there is a remarkably clear and strong ethical element throughout Zoroastrianism. It is from the same stock as Hinduism, yet it frees itself from the Hindu indolence in moral discrimination. Persia brings out and accentuates the ethical distinctions which Hinduism leaves undeveloped. The Deva, or lesser god of India, becomes the Dâeva, div, or devil of Persia. And, on the other hand, the Asura, or more spiritual and supersensuous deity of India, though there in course of time becoming less popular, and even despised, as inferior to the sensuous Deva, becomes in Persia the Ahura, or deity of light and goodness.* "No religion has so clearly grasped the ideas of guilt and of merit" as Zoroastrianism.

* "Encyclopædia Britannica," vol. ix.: Geldner's article "Zoroaster."

Its prayer, or spell, is:

"The will of the Lord is the law of holiness; the riches of Vohu Manu shall be given to him who works in this world for Mazda, and wields according to the will of Ahura the power he gave him to relieve the poor."

Mohammedanism brings out the opposite idea of the fixity of all things in God, life being not so much a struggle as a fatality in which the true solution is unhesitatingly submission to the Divine Will:

"Whatever good betideth thee is from God,
And whatever betideth thee of evil is from thyself."

Egypt faced the mystery of being as a cycle of bodily life whose infinite variety revealed the Divine Spirit. The prayer rose to purest aspiration:

"O my God and Lord, who hast made me and formed me,
Give me an eye to see and an ear to hear Thy glories."

Brahmaism turned from the bodily variety to the spiritual unity of things. The Vedanta principle is: "One only essence without a second." "Brahma exists truly, the world falsely." "The soul is only Brahma and no others." The Gayatri, the daily invocation of every Brahman is:

"Let us meditate on that excellent glory of the Divine life-giver; may He enlighten our understandings."

Confucianism directed all its appeal to the material and temporal interests of the individual

as a social being and a citizen. Its ideal was stability. Its ancestor-worship implied a golden age in the past, an age exhibiting the orderly operation of universal Tao and Reason. Lao Tsze, the founder of Taoism, preached stillness and self-emptiness.* According to him, Tao is the method of the universe, and self-effacement is needed to allow one's being to be suffused and nourished by the universal life. He said: "Follow diligently the way in your own heart, but make no display of it to the world." Confucius, on the other hand, insisted on ceremonial observances and conscious well-doing. He would not speak of spirits, nor of the future life: "While not able to serve men, how can you serve spirits? While you do not know life, how can you know death?" He ceased using the personal form Ti for God and preferred the impersonal Tien, Heaven. Yet Tao was a word often used by Confucius, though he deliberately neglected its speculative and religious implications. He says in the Shu King: "The heart of man is full of stumbling-blocks; the heart of Tao is simple and secret." "He who obeyeth the law of reason and nature is happy: he who breaketh it is unhappy." Man's highest virtue he held to consist in the recovery and preservation of the

* R. K. Douglas, "Confucianism." J. Legge, "Religions of China."

ancient wisdom of which the inner principle was Tao. The Emperor at the Annual worship of Heaven prayed:

"I, ..., having received from above the gracious decree to nourish and console the inhabitants of all regions . . . think with sympathy of all men, earnestly desirous of their prosperity. . . . I earnestly look up, hoping for merciful protection. . . . I beg reverently to Heaven to protect and assist the Empire so that calamity and disturbance may soon come to an end, and the Empire enjoy universal peace. . . . For this I humbly pray. . . ."*

These faiths differ widely in detail; yet how near their prayers come to one type! They are efforts, each in some degree effectual, to get into right relations with the universal Power. They all import into human life a principle of interpretation and an impulse of energy corresponding in each case to the conception they severally form of that Power. How far this objectivity may be invalidated in particular cases by obscurity or distortion must of course be considered; and this question will arise for us in the next chapter when dealing with the challenge of faith as a truth. Yet, though among them Judaism and Christianity alone present a continuity of progressive revelation, it is to be recognized that the ethnic forms at their best offer unmistakable preparation for a fuller revelation. "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that

* Edkins, "Religion in China."

feareth Him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to Him" (Acts x. 34, 35). To the Jew, God is reality as the Absolute Person upon whose will all creation depends. The world and the heavens are real enough, but have their being only as the work of His hands: "They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure: yea all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt Thou change them, and they shall be changed. But Thou art the same, and Thy years shall have no end" (Ps. cii. 25, 26). God is not discovered by men, but comes near and reveals Himself, entering into covenant relations with them. Traces of earlier faiths are seen in their usage of teraphim and ephods as household gods or oracles. Possibly traces of animism survive in the "Oak of Moreh." And in the Mazzeboth and Ashera of the surrounding Semitic tribes, from which it was difficult to keep Judaism, there is distinct advance on animism. Baal was personal lord of a region, or of some feature of nature, and stood in a definite relation towards all his worshippers. But in Israel Jehovah is specially and altogether Lord of His people, quite apart from and above particular natural conditions. The people, indeed, are promised and then are given a land to which Jehovah's interest is considered as specially pledged for their sake. He is their national God under

Whom the tribes find their unity with one another. Throughout their history their idea of God and of His relation to them grows richer and more spiritual. From the beginning He is the God that saves them, and through His ministers dispenses justice and mercy to them. But He is the jealous God, who will not tolerate any rivalry from the gods of other nations. From the time, however, of Elijah's successful challenge of the Baal priests the idea of any reality whatever attaching to other gods than Jehovah is excluded. And, with the writing prophets, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and the others whose message comes in literary form, the idea of His righteousness is fully brought out and is recognized as constituting Him a universal moral ruler. The teaching of these later prophets was that God would establish righteousness in the earth even if He in so doing had to punish and destroy His "own" people. This was to recognize Him as no merely national deity, but one to whom "all the ends of the earth" must look to be saved.

Christianity develops this ethical and redemptive conception, and displays the "express image" (Heb. i. 3) of the Divine person, "the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. ii. 9), in the man Christ Jesus; and then in the spirit and activity of the Christian Church. God is seen to be not

only universal Deity, but universal Fatherhood. The revelation to man is not externally imposed as a covenant with a transcendent Being, it is essentially inward and spiritual. As a father seeks fellowship with his children, God is seeking those who will worship Him in spirit and in truth. And Fatherhood has the two functions of Righteousness and Love. God is righteous, man must be righteous too. Not one jot or tittle of justice can be foregone, or the Father would cease to be also the strong upholder of the world. But man is sinful. He lives only by the grace of God's long-suffering and patient love. And further, man as a sinner is not left to his sin, but is sought out, pleaded with, and, on repenting, is forgiven and restored by that love. It is with this twofold Divine activity inseparably and consistently displayed in His life that Jesus appears. He is righteous. Every strong personality in its measure disturbs history; but the personality of Jesus has made an impression on the race with which no other can compare in magnitude; and it is an impression of blamelessness and moral grandeur. Tested by all standards of ethics, He outstrips them and sets a new standard. His is too perfect a life to have been invented or imagined. Fiction has unceasingly aimed to reach and outstrip Jesus, but has at best only unconsciously borrowed from

Him. He is the ultimate ontological argument for God. His consciousness is the complete God-consciousness in the form in which man can be conscious of God. There must be a Father-God, for there has been a Jesus Christ. Such a Man, with His Divine consciousness and His Divine character, is surely, in fact, the Son of God. Theology's first serious conflict, indeed, was to maintain not that such a personality was divine, but that it was truly human. Jesus was in full and without failure that human image of the Divine perfection which other lives are in part and in more or less disfigurement. But with the moral perfectness as righteousness there is also the moral perfectness as love revealed and active in Him. "Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners" (1 Tim. i. 15). It is in Jesus Christ that man first receives and realizes the full import of this stupendous revelation of the love of God. That God so loved the world is the central word of the Gospel. Jesus died for sinners. And He is the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. xiii. 8). What He shows to the world in His death is what from the beginning has been God's relation to His sinful child. Perfectly righteous, perfectly loving, God's "only begotten" suffers, "the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God."

In respect to the Redemptive function, Jesus is

Son of God in a degree and a mode which transcend the ordinary. He is the "firstborn among many brethren" (Rom. viii. 29). There is that in Him which marks Him off from us so that He is truly one in whom "God commendeth His own love towards us," while there is also that in Him which brings Him close to us His brethren, so that He can truly enter into our condition and we into His. There is for us a transcendence and an immanence of Jesus corresponding to the transcendence and immanence of God. The full Divine nature of the Son of Man distinguishes Jesus as a new experience of the race. But those who believe on Him and receive His Spirit themselves enter into this new experience and perpetuate it. And, on the other hand, "He that hath not the Son of God hath not life" (1 John v., 12). With unbelievers eternal life is a potentiality either undeveloped or deliberately neglected and refused. With believers "the spirit of life in Christ Jesus" (Rom. viii. 2) proceeds not only to regenerate individual lives, but to build them up into a regenerated society, whose bond is the holy love of God. Upon this society it lies to preach the Gospel to every creature. The regenerated society is to regenerate the world by the power of the indwelling Spirit of Christ.

Thus to the account of faith as the creative

element in reality must be placed conspicuously the great characters, the powerful movements, and lofty ideals that in the Christian Church have contributed so markedly to the world's life. Thomas Carlyle considered the history of the world to be at bottom the history of its great men, and the primary fact about a great man to be his religion. From that point of view the contribution of Christianity to the world's experience is Jesus Christ. The significant and dynamic centre of Jesus Christ is His consciousness of the Father. In this we see faith completely unfolding its content, achieving its function, and making the Son of Man in His perfect Union with God the effectual agent of the Divine nature towards the world. Through our faith in Him Jesus becomes historically creative of a new civilization, a new level of personal consciousness, and an ideal which, while stimulating infinite progress, has also a finality and completeness in itself.

To the Christian his faith is not simply a function of his own personality opening up its own subliminal or supraliminal contents; it is a faculty of union and communion with the Divine Personality, who uses this faculty of ours to open up Himself to us. Through our faith in Him God opens up not only our own personality in a fuller light, but His own personality as the

source and perfecting of ours. Knowledge through our faith in God becomes revelation, and, as such, it is not less, but more truly and fundamentally knowledge, than when the personality is only partly conscious of being engaged in the unity.

From the point of view of faith all the inductive sciences become departments of theology. Not that this is any degree to restrict their range or foreclose their findings; but, on the contrary, it is to preserve their range infinitely open, and to suggest ever richer, higher, bolder hypothesis on which to conduct empirical investigation. Yet on the postulate of a reality transcending nature is there no point in our experience at which this transcendence exhibits or asserts itself? If physical nature is from the standpoint of faith a department of revelation, is the transcendent never revealed through nature? Is it all uniformity and never freedom? Can there not be in nature a freedom which is not capricious, and a reason which is not necessitated, but is interpretative of personality and love?

The view which represents miracle as mere violation of order neglects the consideration that the order of nature itself involves something that transcends nature. It involves energy and rational method. To transcend order, as rational volition does when it stops, hastens, alters, or

otherwise controls a natural process, is in a sense a violation of that order; but it is not a matter of breakdown and injury, it is rather the enforced absorption of a lower order by a higher. In any case, it is not clear that the moral power at the heart of all physical order must necessarily show itself always under conditions of physical causation. There may be reasonable purpose displayed in exceptional as well as in ordinary modes of Divine activity. Miraculous events cannot be irregular in the sense of irrational. They must be understood as the outcome of Divine reason even if no physically natural law of miracles be found. Christianity may be classed as natural, but only by deepening our sense of the ultimate miraculousness of nature until we explain nature through God. Theology finds in nature ultimately only one cause—the will of God; and in miracle, thus, it finds only a modification of the generally observed ways in which nature moves.

As to specific alleged miracles, every case must be taken on its merits. Ordinary evidence must show whether there has been more than the ordinary process at work, and whether definite volition is to be recognized controlling and altering "natural" process. When one reads of the serpent speaking in Eden one has to reflect whether this should be looked at even for a moment as a

miracle, or whether rather it is not simply a detail in a great picture-parable, the very material for which is borrowed from days when primitive man made no racial distinction between himself and the creatures. When we read of Moses striking water from the rock and making streams in the desert, we are touching facts of Divine providence; facts greatly allegorized later, yet, at the basis, facts that had bitten deep into Israel's memory of their long desert life. The sun standing still for Joshua's long day of battle, on close reading, proves to be pure poetry, the wonder really being that of the marvellously sustained courage and strength of Joshua that finished the task before sundown. Jonah in the whale has been questioned as impossible; and, on the other hand, we have been told to consider the great fish in the South Kensington Museum and know that there are whales able to swallow two or three mouthfuls like Jonah easily, and deliver them again. Yet this also seems all through to be not an actual incident so much as an illustration in a parable; it is the allegory in the great missionary sermon urging the narrow Jewish nationalism forward to its universal mission. The story of the axe-head that floated is in an ordinary way incredible now. Yet you may find a modern preacher asserting that it did float and "would have floated even if all the British Associa-

tion had sat upon it." He is entitled to his opinion only in the sense that the significance of the story lies not in its immediate mechanical problem, but in its implication that the constitution of the universe is ultimately spiritual and not mechanical. The preacher, while rhetorically asserting the detail, is to be understood as pledged primarily to the principle. Any alleged miracle must stand or fall by the ordinary rules of evidence and of common sense; only that it be a fact and not a figure of speech that is in question, must be shown; and the standpoint must be that of the highest of the interpretative principles we have. When we come to the miracles of the New Testament and find Jesus healing the sick, raising the dead, walking on the water, feeding five thousand people with five barley cakes, seeing a coin in a fish's mouth while the fish was still far off swimming in the sea uncaught, the believer must be left free to question and reject if evidence for any particular occurrence is insufficient. But faith is the unhesitating and universal recognition of the possibility of miracle as the exhibited dominance of spirit over nature's automatism. Of two possible views of the universe that have been described as the closed system and the open system, faith takes the latter as the truer. The man who looks upon the universe as a closed system has it before him like a closed box crammed

with fine, close machinery going like clockwork. Nothing can alter anything. A miracle to him would be like a knife stuck into the box from outside; but, strictly, for his mind there is no outside, all is inside the box. It is of no use to speak of miracle, therefore, to one who thinks thus of the universe as a closed-in machine. And it is equally useless to speak of faith, hope, love, eternity, goodness, sin, salvation; for these are not mechanical. On the other hand, as an open system the world may still be regarded, if you will, as a box of machinery; but in and about the machinery there is spirit, there is intelligence and will; and these it is the purpose of the machinery to express, if indeed they are not recognized as constituting the machinery itself out of their own transcendent forces. The mechanism is not like clockwork wound up and left to itself, it is always and everywhere under a reasoned, and when fully understood a recognizably *good*, control. The box is open. The miracle is not a knife stuck into the box against all regulation, it is some specially noticed and specially significant movement of the intelligent and purposive spirit that is not only in but above all things, as my mind and my will are in and above the fingers of my hand as I open and close them.

Possible? "All things are possible with God,"

said Jesus. "All things are possible to him that believeth." That is the scientific principle of miracle. It is the principle of mechanism *open to spirit*. It does not shut out will. It does not shut out purpose, and intention, and meaning. It leaves room for ideals and efforts, for obedience, and for love. All these things are miracle in relation to the mechanism of nature. It is not that miracle is evidence for God, but God is the evidence for miracle. Belief in God is the beginning of miracle, in that it keeps the box open. In a sense every act of human will is miracle. The determinist declares that all such purely human freedom is shut within the closed universe. But when I look up and say, "I believe in God," the glamour of that prison wall fades, and I know that I am free. And as surely as I can get up and do things, things which ought to be done, that are at least, morally permissible and are desired, and yet that will not be done unless I do them, my mind is open to see God do things, things that ought to be done, that are at least morally permissible and are desired, and yet that will not be done unless God does them. That is true miracle. All prayer is in its nature and action miracle. If I want water in the desert, of course I cannot order God about and make Him put water there, but just as my own desire and will can go a long way in some circumstances

to create what I want, if it please God that my prayer for His good purposes, consistently with His glory, love, and wisdom to make a spring burst out—at least it is consistent with my belief in Him, however surprising the event. It is not the miracle that compels the belief in God. "Though one rose from the dead, yet would they not believe." It is the belief in God that prepares the mind for miracle. The evidence for the miracles of Jesus is Jesus Himself. If He be the Son of God—and from His character, His teaching, His message, His living and mighty spirit He looks like it—that is the greatest conceivable of all miracles—God become Man. And it is not incredible, but to be expected, that such manhood should reach out beyond the average, and even beyond the previous maximum, of human control of nature.

But now as to the specific contents of Revelation. Does God speak to us specially in the Bible, or are we to reckon it as revelation only on the level of any other book? The answer must be found in the quality and nature of the message. Certainly the Bible is to be taken as a book among books, and is to be estimated strictly on its recognizable merits. But the test must be made by the application of our highest principle. The explanation of the supreme authority and influence that

the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments have had above all other books appears to lie in the unsurpassed thoroughness with which personality is therein revealed and appealed to. "The Bible finds me." It is a message from a perfect, eternal Personality, God; through a perfect historical Personality, Jesus Christ; to an imperfect, yet perfectible and prospectively perfect personality, Man. It is this that gives the strange unity of a single volume to a miscellany of sixty-six books slowly sifted out of the literature of fifty centuries. It is this that raises the Bible pre-eminent above the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Homeric poems, the Zend-Avesta, the Koran, the Vedas or the Chinese Classics. They, too, are full of personality and are thus the "Bibles" of the Gentiles; but in their peculiar quality as spiritual books the Bible of Christendom is the sum and centre of the system. It is the completeness of its message that constitutes it for us the written Word of God.

In the history of Redemption theology traces the movement of Divine Personality not simply as declaring itself, but as becoming operative to recover the finite personality from error and sin, and to lead it in the way of perfection. Revelation is the unfolding of perfect personality; it is the exhibiting of the Eternal under conditions of

time and space; it is God entering History. The culmination of this movement is in the perfect man Jesus Christ, who is thus really no miracle when viewed from the highest standpoint. He is normal man. And this working up to the normal is the thread of unity that runs through the Scriptures. Yet the thread is scarlet with crime. The working up to the normal is at every point an exhibition of the abnormal. The miracle of personality, if we take miracle in the sense of the abnormal, is not perfection, but sin. The book of perfect personality begins with God and ends with God; but in describing man as apart from God it begins with a murder and culminates in a crucifixion. The practical theme of the Bible is the redemption of the race from sin.

What solution is there of the mystery of evil in God's world? The sufferings of the lower creatures starved in winter, or perishing from diseases in summer; fish preying on each other, from the tiniest animalculæ up to whales, in a fierce struggle for existence; the perpetual internecine wars of insects, birds, and beasts; these ruthless conditions do not suggest to us that there is any personal control of nature by a merciful, wise, and loving God. Human suffering seems part of a vast system of natural pain, and is the

more acute and inexplicable because of man's higher sensibility. Children are born into the world sometimes already diseased and foredoomed to an existence of physical misery. Contagion and infection overwhelm the innocent with the guilty. Great upheavals of nature in earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions destroy prosperity, happiness, and life itself, to serve no obvious purpose. It seems unmitigated evil, or at least inexplicable fate. Even if these objections are mitigated by the consideration that we see only a little of nature's process, and that if we saw the whole it might show a wise and merciful tendency and that all partial evil is for the universal good, this mitigation cannot apply to moral evil. That the Divine Will should create and sustain an evil will seems a contradiction of any claim for moral perfection in the Divine Will. Moral evil seems absolutely evil. Either God cannot suppress this evil, in which case He is not Almighty; or He will not, in which case He is not all good. That sin is error or folly indicates a failure in the wisdom of the Creator; that it involves guilt is a slur on His holiness. These things can be understood as cosmic imperfections, but not as the will of a morally perfect God. Even if sin be inevitable in a created world, a perfect God would set some limit to its devastations; nay, would He not

withdraw Himself from maintaining the sinful creature in existence?

Faced by this contradiction of evil in the Divine creation, Leibnitz held the world to be not absolutely perfect, but the best of all *possible* worlds, and the evil in it to be thus an outcome of the best possible purpose. In the *Théodicée* he distinguishes *metaphysical* evil, as the limitation of finite things, a limitation unconditionally willed by God as inseparable from creation; *physical* evil, which is conditionally willed by God in the form of pain and other retribution; and *moral* evil, which is the only kind not directly willed by God, and thus is apparently inconsistent with the idea of God. But he regards moral evil as "permitted" in order to give reality to free will, and thus to virtue. He claims it is only a negative thing, a failure, an imperfection due to man's limitations. Evil in this sense lay inevitably implicit in the design before the world in actuality began. So, the purpose being good, evil itself in the long run will be found to work out into good.

This theory seems not so much to account for evil as to deny its reality. Evil, if not only in its results but in its origin part of a scheme on the whole good, is really only good disguised or deferred. It is no real opposite of good. And this wiping out of the distinction between God and evil involves an

inadequate view of human personality. Man in this view can do only good; cannot do anything not already anticipated in the Divine intention; and thus he is necessitated, not free; he is not fully a personal agent. Moreover, if all evil is ultimately by Divine provision to work for good, there is left no place for moral responsibility and no motive for avoiding evil.

Comte's theory is that moral evil arises out of the egoistic impulse predominating over the altruistic; and that evil vanishes as natural self-will is subjected to the social impulse. Man as individual is but an organ or part of man as the Great Being; he is essentially social, and is not truly himself when following the anti-social impulse of evil. This anti-social impulse is discouraged by the limits which the external world presents to man's self-will, and by the strife and contention with one's fellow-men that it occasions; and Comte comes to regard this reaction of an imperfect environment, imperfect, at least, for the immediate happiness of the individual, as operating, almost with design, beneficially. Not only Humanity exerts pressure on the individual to suppress his egoism, but in some degree also the natural world so operates.

This, too, is a defective view of personality. It does not show how the change from the egoistic

to the altruistic is to be brought about. Public opinion and a certain fatality in nature are influences, but they are not adequate *causes*, of a man's change from evil to good. They are external and non-moral pressure, unless they are associated with some recognizable subjective moral conditions. The egoistic impulse may acquiesce in them simply as contributory to self-interest, and remain egoistic still. This inadequacy is due, of course, to Comte's refusal to look for *cause* in any case, and his banning of all metaphysical elements in the conceptions of right and duty. There is no true idea of evil here, as there is no true idea of good. In Humanity Comte attempts to set forth a concrete embodiment of reality and goodness, but its creative principle is not clearly affirmed.

More successfully, perhaps, Edward Caird accounts for evil as a negation of good, which in the long run results only in a more perfect affirmation. He traces the growth of the belief in evil spirits as accompanying the growth of ethical monotheism.* The god of one tribe was regarded by a hostile tribe as, relatively, a hostile deity, or devil. The idea that the gods of the heathen are devils survived even into Christian times. The only sin against a tribal god was the

* "Evolution of Religion," ii. p. 112.

disloyalty or rebellion that could have recourse to the god of an alien tribe. But with the universalizing of the idea of Jehovah in Israel, and the recognition of Him as supreme and even sole deity, there came the consciousness of evil as in some sense an independent, though subordinate, power. In Job the evil spirit is still in some sense a servant of God, of inferior and delegated power. At this point, however, evil is recognized as far more than simple disloyalty to external and limited sovereignty; it is felt to be an intense peril to the individual and to the world because it is disloyalty to infinite and moral authority. Israel's growing sense of evil as definite opposition to God's will was probably intensified and developed during the Exile by contact with the Persian dualism of Ormuzd and Ahriman*; and it appears in New Testament times as a kingdom of evil under Beelzebub, or Satan, and the "powers of darkness." This attitude is, as regards the present, an attitude of despair; the world's hope that good will triumph is relegated to a far-off future. These ideas found some expression in the teachings of Jesus. Yet also, in His teachings as to the relation of the world to the Father, and as to the Father's absolute and final sovereignty, there is suggested that the dualism is

* Whitehouse in Hastings' "Dictionary of the Bible."

being gathered up into one Divine purpose of a Highest Good. Caird's solution, thus, in relating the "negation" and the "affirmation" to Divine Personality as central, preserves for the problem a concreteness and reality which tend to disappear from all solutions which fall short of the fully religious standpoint.

But what, then, is to be said as to the personality of the devil? If personality is the ultimate basis of reality, evil and the spirit of evil as antagonistic to good must be either understood as personality or rejected as unreal. Moral evil, which is a conscious and volitional conflict with the principle of good at work in the universe, must originate either in God, or in Man, or in the Devil as a personal spirit of evil outside both God and Man. The objection to attributing the origin of evil to God is that this would destroy for us the holy character of the Divine Being. God cannot be regarded as the author of moral evil without ceasing to be regarded as perfectly good. He becomes unworthy of our worship, and is no longer the highest Being conceivable. On the other hand, the objection to attributing the origin of evil unconditionally and altogether to Man is that still in a degree it derogates from the moral perfection of the Creator that His *work* should be the origin of moral evil. That man's nature is originally

good and free from moral taint seems a necessary inference from the goodness of God. If evil be inherent in Man's nature, moreover, this lessens, or even destroys, responsibility in Man. Doing evil in this case is but being true to oneself. So we seem driven to the third alternative of a source antagonistic to, and outside of, both God and Man. Yet how can such a conception, though it relieves God of moral defect, and preserves for man his full responsibility, escape the unintelligibility of an ultimate dualism? It sets up a principle of evil alongside the principle of the Supreme Good. It is true that this principle may be conceived negatively and as attaching necessarily to finitude or to material conditions of created life. Evil is thus simply ignorance, error, inexperience, a missing of the mark, folly: "the devil is an ass." But in this sense the defect tends to come back again to our second alternative—as a defect in God's creative work. And in any case the negative conception is hardly sufficient for the facts as to the nature of moral evil, which is a choice of the bad while *knowing* the good.

The devil, thus while understood as a power of evil in the world, other than man and opposed to God, is not to be regarded as an entirely independent and self-originating personal principle of evil. He is rather a fallen personality, dependent

on God for his original nature and existence, but dependent on his own creaturely and misused freedom for the evil that he has come to embody and personalize in its intense and concentrated energy. His relation to God, the Supreme Goodness, is that same opposition which we see in any human evil, but it is developed to extreme consistency of expression. His relation to man is not that of domination or power of any degree, except so far as occasion is voluntarily or negligently permitted by man. The origin of the devil as personal evil spirit is to be conceived as similar to the origin of evil at any point in human experience. Man is possible devil as he is possible deity. "One of you is a devil." The origin is in a wrong or falsely centred act of human freedom. Instead of being centred in a higher and perfect will, an evil act is centred in a selfish opposition to the higher will. The evil choice, once made, no longer confines itself to the personality in which it has originated, but objectifies itself as example and influence. It becomes a force now outside man and opposed to God. It is personal force, though it is emanating from personality in process of disintegration. The devil is thus a personal force, resulting from a sin of a creature of God, reacting on that creature and on all creatures, and growing in strength and intensity of opposition to

God by all subsequent acts of moral evil from all creatures. The devil is thus personal; yet, as purely evil, he is hardly to be regarded as a completed personality. He is ever striving for a full expression of himself over against the Divine, yet never attains to it. While the conception of the devil or the spirit of evil thus is not completely to be defined as the necessary implicate of God, or of the Spirit of Goodness, it still has more than a purely negative character. Though it is essentially a false principle, it has the form of eternally trying to establish itself as the positive alternative to the true.

The personality of the devil thus is conceivable, as a real and even historical, though only as a fallen and essentially *failing*, personality, gathering to itself as centre all evil thoughts and deeds of men, as additions to its momentum against the good. Upon God lies a responsibility for the possibility of evil, though, as this possibility is inseparable from the conditions under which moral personality is realizable in a finite world, its consistency with moral perfection is inferable. But responsibility for the *actuality* of evil lies on the first evil-doer, and on all subsequent evil-doers, in respect of their free choice of evil rather than good. The cumulative *committed* evil of the world becomes the personal principle of evil or the devil.

The correction to the dualism which still clings to this besetting of man by the possibility, and more than the possibility, of evil, the temptation to it is to be found not in any impersonal cosmic view of evil being relative to a final good, but in the Christian doctrine of Redemption, which finds full expression for the personal relations involved. "God so loved the world." "One died for all." "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses." The cosmic process does not leave room either for human freedom or for Divine holiness unless they are exhibited, as in theology, from the standpoint of personal spirit. The Cross of Christ was more than Caird's* "necessary tragic solution of a conflict of principles." No doubt it was at least this. Jesus represented the universal relation of God to man. Judaism represented the particular covenant of God with Israel. Jesus taught that Israel could secure its particular covenant only in and through the universal covenant of God with man; and that the exclusiveness of the nation must be surrendered, and Israel must be willing to die as Israel according to the flesh, in order to truly live as Israel according to the spirit. Jesus called upon Judaism to make itself, at all costs, the herald and instrument of a

* "Evolution of Religion," ii., p. 191.

universal Divine life. Their unwillingness to respond precipitated a tragedy which was in a sense needed for the full display of the principles involved. For the Jews to assert in themselves their own particular interests, "saving their life," and so, according to Jesus, really losing it, was to attack in the person of Jesus the universal principle by which He would have them "lose their life for the Gospel," and so really save it. They must needs put Him to death as a peril to their privilege. And Jesus, for His part, must be willing to die as an illustration and an assertion of His universal principle. The extreme expression of the particularist finite principle, in the antagonism which forced on the crucifixion, furnished the Divine universalism with its opportunity of full manifestation. The range and power of the Divine love could in no other way be displayed than in this evoking of the utmost malignity of the opposition which it proposed to overcome.

But the reality of human redemption fades into a metaphysical abstraction when translated from its personal terms into mere reconciliation of principles. The Cross is no mere symbol of abstract truth, it is a living and historical movement in which God is reconciling to Himself the sinful human heart.

The Religious Life, thus, is the normal move-

ment of finite personality in its relations with the Divine personality. Broadly applying the distinctions, it is the realm of the Holy Spirit, as Salvation is the realm of the Son, and Revelation the realm of the Father.

And first and chiefly, it is to be remarked that here faith has, along with its cognitive and unitive movements, also a universal compulsive function. It is a dynamic. It is at once our demand on God and God's demand on us. It is life's driving power. The Holy Spirit must not be quenched, grieved, nor resisted by the spirit of man. For man's perfecting the rule is that which Jesus gave to His followers: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." This involves worship. If a man ceases to worship, he passes out of the mid-stream of human progress into the shallows. And sooner or later the soul's worship must broaden into fellowship with other souls in worship. Man's nature is social, and the Divine call moves man towards a social ideal. The unity of man with God issues in a unity of man with man. But this social ideal finds its first stage of reality in the Church. Jesus Christ gave Himself "for the life of the world," but not till He had found a fellowship of Twelve, to whom He could give Himself in a degree in which He could not at the first give Himself to others. "I pray not for the world,

but for those whom Thou hast given Me" (John xvii. 9). There is needed for social advance not simply individual worship, but the worship of individuals in fellowship together, in a Holy Communion. Prospectively all humanity belongs to the Church; but, for the time being and actually, only they belong to the Church who have in them the Spirit of God, and who enter the fellowship of the Spirit with others like-minded. This movement from individual to social worship is at once advance in personal growth and equipment for service of a higher grade than is open to the individual. The community-consciousness sets forth a relationship in which the individual realizes not only a personal unity with God and with those who are like-minded with himself towards God, but, across the antagonism now acutely defined, an unexpected unity with the "world" that is opposed to God. His spirit, enriched and developed in its unity with God through the fellowship of the Church, can now enter into the redemptive movement of the Divine towards all, and especially towards the lost. Hence the Church, while in structure a fellowship, is in its activity a mission. Its work is to seek and to save the lost; it is to preach the Gospel to every creature.

In this the Church becomes in no sense an alternative to the world, as though the world

were the lost part and the Church the saved part of God's work: it becomes rather the servant of the world. As "the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister," the Church exists to serve for the good of the world, not to be served or ministered to by the world. The end in view is not the Church in itself, but the Church as the effective instrument of a renovation and perfecting of the world as the "kingdom of God." When all humanity is gathered into the Church what we shall have will be the "new heaven and a new earth," "the holy city, new Jerusalem"; it will be the social state purified and perfected; not some spiritual abstraction from the world, but the world in possession of its victory over all antagonisms to its true well-being. So faith, while it impels definitely to worship and to a spiritual fellowship, finds its outlet everywhere across the whole range of human interests. Since Schleiermacher theologians have generally recognized that *pectus facit theologum*, that religious doctrine cannot be formulated nor understood unless the heart, that is, the whole nature, accept and obey the truth in the very movement of formulating it. The irritating dualism, of the suggestion here that theological science demands something of us that the other sciences do not demand, is to be removed by insisting that

ultimately *pectus facit omnem et omnia*, ultimately faith, the heart, the acquiescence of the entire personality, is required in every scientist and for the establishing of every science. And in practical life at every point for the securing of highest results the religious spirit is a necessity. Faith has no special department. All reality is the field in which faith is ultimately interpreter and energy. All life rightly lived is the religious life; and no life is religious unless it reveals the process of Divine goodness becoming human.

Yet, are we to consider this world's humanity, and this limited arena of an individual's three-score and ten years, the only scene of the Eternal process for us? What of immortality? Does the soul survive the body? The usual considerations on this point are that the personality is not identical with the body, nor with any part of it. And though the personality is dependent on bodily organs for its expression, and even for its development in human birth and growth, there is in its *thought* and *volition* a nature quite different from that of the bodily organization, and not liable to the processes of bodily decay. The self, in its conscious thought, cannot find a place for its own dissolution, though it can for the dissolution of its body. Again, the self, in its moral volitions, seems to necessitate or demand a continuity in

some form beyond death, for the completion of its ideals and for the compensations and adjustments which ought to be carried out, but which, under the limiting conditions of essentially lower and incidental interests cannot be carried out. The soul possesses unlimited capability of improvement; its best expression is found in yearning and striving towards an excellence which disease, decay, and death seem quite unreasonably and unjustly to interfere with. At its best the soul cannot restrain its hope, its expectancy, and even its demand for survival. Moreover, the self-consciousness of man is his share in a universal and infinite life which, though expressed in time and space, and in growth and decay, is not entirely subordinated to these; and which, if it finds expression thus, may conceivably be expected to find still better expression in some higher mode when these have reached their utmost limit and have proved inadequate to express the Universal. And again, that human desire in its highest movements, such as the aspiration to moral perfection, and the effort to understand life's mystery and to establish relations with God—that these purest and most soaring desires are not fully satisfied in the present life constitutes a ground of confidence in a future life. For, even at the moment when such desires are recognized as failing to achieve their end there

appears in them a tendency to persist and to renew themselves. They do not altogether fail, but yield progress towards a goal which becomes in part attained, but is never completely attained, on earth. Life rises, knowledge increases, a sense of the desired intimacy with the Divine comes. And, though the physical order closes in around these forward tendencies, they yield to the soul some consciousness of a "better world" to which, in some way, it already belongs. They give a consciousness of worth higher than the worth that attaches to material and perishing nature. They bring the dawning of a conviction that reconciliation and right relations with God will in some way make the soul partner in the abiding life of God.

The expectation of the survival of the soul is one of the characteristics found everywhere always and among all men in some form. In strange contrast with the Egyptian ideas, in which a future life was elaborately anticipated and prepared for, though not conceived as essentially a moral and spiritual progress, the teaching of Moses (though he had been educated in Egypt) told practically nothing of a future state. He propounded for Israel a stern and high moral ideal, with such emphasis in its requirements and such conviction of its inherent sufficiency here and

now, that practically no outlook on a future world was included. So for Israel to die was little else than to be gathered to their fathers. Yet in the necromancy of the witch of Endor, and in the idea of Sheol or Hades set forth in the Taunt Song of Isaiah, there is the popular conception of life being continued in a shadowy fashion after the death of the body. In the Psalms and the prophetic writings the conviction of immortality reaches very definite if only occasional expression. "Thou wilt not leave my soul to Sheol; neither wilt Thou suffer Thine only one to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10). "I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness" (Ps. xvii. 15). "If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, Thou art there" (Ps. cxxxix. 8). "He hath swallowed up death for ever" (Isa. xxv. 8). "Thy dead shall live; my dead bodies shall arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust . . . the earth shall cast forth the dead" (Isa. xxvi. 19). Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones, and the remarkable passage in Daniel xii. 2, "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt," show the development of the belief in the Old Testament times. When we come to the New Testament we find that the full orthodoxy of the Scribes and Pharisees in this respect is that

they believe in the resurrection. And, in the Gospel, "life and immortality" are brought to light with fullest and most explicit emphasis through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. The ideas of the Christian are set not on death as the end of life at all. The idea of a temporal end or termination is absorbed by the larger idea of a teleological end or attainment. The end of life is no longer thought of as in any real sense a cessation, it is taken up into Christ: our consummation is a union with Him in which we are not annihilated, or reduced, but perfected. Once more the problem culminates, as it began, in personality.

Can our eternal life ever be for us here more than a blessed hope, a living faith? Perhaps not. But can *anything* be to us more than a faith? It is our contention throughout that faith, normally active and progressively enlightened, furnishes for us at once the bedrock of reality and the goal of our conscious life. "This is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our faith" (1 John v. 4).

It is not quite clear that in the consummation the individual will fully preserve individual identity. Questions arise as to whether the "spiritual body" by which the Apostle Paul interprets the resurrection will be a recognizable sublimation of the natural body; and,

in any case, whether a purely spiritual form of personal life can finally preserve separate identity, so that we shall recognize friends "by the traits of their character, by the trend of their lives, by the effluence of their spirits, by the atmosphere which surrounds them."* And something can be said to justify our answering, especially the latter of these two questions, in the affirmative. The Absolute Personality has no interest in destroying its differentiations into relative personalities; on the contrary, it finds expression through them, and so requires them, and is enriched by them. Thus the process of advance from the natural and the temporal into the Spiritual and Eternal must not in any sense be represented as an impoverishment. Moreover, if for the eternal world time and space in a sense lose their significance it is only that the hindrance and insecurity (with correlative advantages), which they impose on the soul's life are removed, not that they are essentially destroyed or abolished.

"All that is, at all
Lasts ever, past recall;

. . . . .

What entered into thee
That was, is, and shall be."

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* A. W. Momerie, "Immortality."

The individual phase of the soul's experience, once having been real, remains real and in true relation with whatever phases follow. Faith's sure basis for this, however, is that God will not "play the confidence trick" upon us. He will give to faith either exactly what it asks of Him or something which will prove even more satisfying.

IV

THE CHALLENGE OF FAITH AS A TRUTH

The mind's prerogative — Excess or defect in the act modifies the contents of faith—Systems which would eliminate faith : Scepticism, Agnosticism, Ethicism, Naturalism, Positivism, Materialism, Pantheism—They fail because they imply the principle that they challenge, thus contradicting themselves.

IF it is established that faith constitutes reality both as a subjective movement and as an objective fact, there arises then the further question whether it also constitutes true knowledge. Is the movement a valid process, and is the resultant thought a secure acquisition, as knowledge? Or is faith only a primary chaos which, when once it has given birth to experience, should itself disappear as a superfluity from our knowledge of that experience? It is a problem in epistemology. If reality is in some sense an inference from faith, is our knowledge in respect of that inference scientifically based? And especially does inference from faith always yield true knowledge? It is the prerogative of mind to challenge its own contents exhaustively. Is faith the experi-

ment of ignorance? or is it not rather, in the highest degree, the experiment and the venture of knowledge, as it is also the experiment and venture of goodness and of personality?

As an act, faith is liable to invalidity through excess or defect in its several characteristic movements as knowledge, trust, or submission. In the intellectual movement excess becomes credulity and dogmatism; deficiency is incredulity and vacuity of mind. In the practical impulse of trust excess becomes superstition; deficiency is unbelief and pyrrhonism. In the full personal movement of submission excess shows itself as servility, fanaticism, fatalism; while deficiency works out as egotism, pride, and despair. On the other hand, as an experience faith may develop error rather than truth, through a false objectifying of its content. This may take the form of an egotism, an inversion of principle, or simply an ignorance of God for which the corrective is to bring to the individual the help of experience which is already accumulated by the race as a whole.

Where the reference to a Higher than self is not truly made but inclines to mere self-assertion, either open or disguised, it becomes an insecure self-confidence and issues in disaster. The form of this failure varies accordingly as intellect, will, or intuitional feeling predominates. Where in-

tellect and will are in excess, faith's movement no longer yields a consciousness of God in man, but rather a human pride and isolation, "the man of sin . . . . that opposeth himself and exalteth himself against all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he sitteth in the Temple of God, setting himself forth as God" (2 Thess. ii, 3-4).

It may take simply the form of this egotistic assumption of infallibility; or it may be also a sacrilegious defiance of the Holy Spirit; as when a Herod accepts homage as a god, or an Alexander VI. sits as Pope; or, in any life, the self makes assertion of its own exclusive and final authority. In the more emotional form, when the intellectual and the volitional are in part suppressed, it issues in the pathological phases of asceticism:

"Some fever of the blood and brain,
Some self-exalting spell;
The scourger's keen delight of pain,
The Dervish dance, the orphic strain,
The wild-haired Bacchant's yell:

"The desert's hair-grown hermit, sunk
The saner brute below;
The naked santon, hashish-drunk,
The cloister-madness of the monk,
The fakir's torture show."*

These mysticisms are an assertion of the soul's object which is nevertheless the virtual destruction

* Whittier's "Brewing of Soma."

of that object, because the soul itself, for which the object is an object, tends to collapse in the process. So the assumption of infallibility becomes a denial and a destruction of reason itself. The elevation of a Borgia, whose government as Christ's vicar presents a scene of hideous immorality and crime, is a total suppression of the spiritual principle; as the devil's mass and black magic are its total inversion and corruption.

But the soul's reference to a Higher than self may be simply inadequate from lack of information. There are "times of ignorance"* where the knowledge of God has not yet been filled out by experience and educated by the collective and advancing wisdom of the race. As through our faith in Him God communicates Himself to us, so He in us becomes an activity in which we are to communicate truth and love to one another, as each has need or opportunity. The Gospel is to be preached in all the world to every creature. For lack of knowledge the people perish. To know God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent is life eternal.

These invalidities of faith as an organ and a constituent of knowledge are, in respect of knowledge, merely abnormalities. In the well-balanced movement of personal advance they either do not

* Acts xvii. 30. Sale's "Koran."

appear at all, or they rapidly subside as the structure of life rises.

Another aspect of the challenge, however, is to be found in the various systems of philosophy and ethics which would neglect or exclude altogether the relations between human and divine. Can such systems establish themselves as satisfactory solutions of their own problems? If they can, then faith which may survive perils from within is now vanquished from without. If they cannot, it may be because these systems though avowedly dispensing with the principle are unconsciously using it; and their house cannot stand, simply because it is divided against itself. In that case faith stands vindicated as both valid and universal, an originating cause and also an abiding constituent of all knowledge.

The most thoroughgoing system which thus would dispense with faith as an essential is scepticism, with David Hume as its clearest modern exponent. Hume, following the associationist psychology of Locke and Berkeley, finds in consciousness only a heap of perceptions; some, the more forceful and lively, are *impressions;* others, like faint copies, are *ideas*. These he finds are connected for us as knowledge by the help of *conceptions* built up by custom. Causality is such a conception. There is thus no necessity perceived in

the relation between cause and effect; there is no real connection; it is a relation purely in the mind, existing simply as an idea, and due entirely to custom. Now this denial of the reality of cause is ultimately a denial of God as the Higher than self. Unless in "custom" Hume can find God, he finds God nowhere. Substance is another "customary" conception, a mere collection of simple ideas united by the imagination. This is essentially a denial of the outer world. And a third merely customary conception is the mind itself as subject of the perceptions. Hume holds it as nothing more than "a heap of different perceptions." This is a denial of the reality of the soul. Such an attitude, however, in dissolving these elements of consciousness into unreality is dissolving all knowledge whatsoever. In the last resort scepticism must turn its weapons upon itself and doubt the principle of doubt. Unconsciously the principle of rationality is assumed and trusted even in the negations and omissions. Unless this assumed basis be trusty and trustworthy, the fabric even of denial falls to the ground. If the conviction that anything at all is real is to be retained then that which enables us to retain it should be frankly investigated. If the structure of experience is held together by "custom" to which as a universal principle of human nature Hume does in fact ascribe whatever stability consciousness

possesses, then such a principle deserves a positive treatment which he did not attempt.

It was Hume's scepticism which awoke Kant "from dogmatic slumber" and set him the task of showing afresh how the mind builds up its contents, and what those contents are. But Kant's reply to Hume is incomplete. He showed that in order to have perceptions at all, the mind itself must provide sense-forms, or pure intuitions of *time* and *space;* and in order to make its perceptions up into knowledge it must further provide pure categories or conceptual forms of the understanding—which are grouped as categories of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, *modality*. These sense-forms and conceptual forms which together furnish the connective links of knowledge are not given to us in sensation, nor are they acquired merely by customary association. Though showing themselves in consciousness only as experience fills them out, and constituting conditions without which experience cannot arise for us at all, they are not in themselves derived from the outer world, but are part of the formal constitution of mind itself.

Thus far the essential rationality and reality of consciousness are apparently vindicated. Then, above the categories of the understanding, Kant finds, as pure ideas of the Reason, the ideas of God, the World, and the Soul, which Hume had

implicitly dismissed as unrealities. But Kant's emphasis on "pure" in the sense of "formal" is now seen to deprive these ideas explicitly of their reality. They are merely regulative, not constitutive, to use his own terms. The ideas of the reason, instead of being highest realities and the source of reality in all things, in Kant's view are "pure" forms without any objective reality of their own. They are empty and meaningless apart from what experience supplies. And, on the other hand, reality is not found to lie in the object presented to experience apart from the pure forms which the mind can bring to the otherwise chaotic presentment. There is still a gulf between the mind and its object. Neither is real apart from the other. And out of two unrealities is reality truly to come? God, as an idea of the reason, has no real being except when and as embodied in human experience! And the world does not exist except when and as embodied in our experience of it. The "pure" categories and the "pure" sense-forms contribute nothing of objective reality to the phenomenal world which thus never passes out of mere appearance. The thing in itself, reality, is regarded as lying somewhere at the back of experience and not as within the known or knowable range of our faculties. This is to revert again to scepticism, though

preparing the way for its less rigorous form as agnosticism.

The standpoint now, in agnosticism, is that of asserting for knowledge an inherent limitation which must be recognized, but cannot be surmounted. The problems of metaphysics are simply abandoned, it being held that ultimate questions as to the cause, the purpose, and the meaning of the Universe belong to the realm of the unknown and unknowable. With Kant agnosticism, however, while abandoning metaphysics does not propose to abandon ethics. And no ethical system can afford to weaken its foundation in a secure knowledge of ourselves and our relation to the Universe. So this system is found giving a measure of recognition to principles of which it confesses itself unable to demonstrate the validity. The term "agnosticism" originated with Huxley, who intended by it to suggest that the speculations of theists are really as baseless as those of the thinkers to whom theologians of the second century derisively applied the term "gnostic." Yet he himself appears to assume that an explanation of the world can be set forth in materialistic terms, and that no explanation is possible on a spiritual hypothesis. His agnosticism is at bottom a theorizing and a venture of faith, if it is not merely a new gnosticism. He says, quite

devoutly: "Sit down before a fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, to follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads you, or you shall learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this."* Yet, to admit any knowledge at all, of any description, however limited, is really to adhere in the first place to the principle of *order*. And to admit any responsibility or moral quality in conduct is to accept in the second place the principle of *duty* and free volition. Kantian agnosticism, in explicitly retaining ethics, is practically using these first principles as necessary, though theoretically it rejects them, as indemonstrable.

Herbert Spencer, while ostensibly attaching himself, through Mansel and Hamilton, to the Kantian position, neither recognizes the positive elements in Kant's Intuitions, Categories, and Ideas, nor accepts Kant's positive inferences from the Practical Reason. He bluntly postulates nescience as the ultimate conception of science, not considering the implication that such an ending must negative the process throughout. He is driven to postulate at least one quality

* Quoted by W. R. Inge, "Faith and its Psychology," p. 200.

for his Unknown and Unknowable—namely, that it is a Power necessarily at work behind the known and knowable. So much he regards as the *inevitable explanation* of what is known. But can that which is inevitably known as a Power be fairly classed as unknown? The agnostic interpretation here, in order to complete itself, must become self-contradictory. It begins with a vitiated induction, and supplements this ultimately with an insecure postulate. The induction is vitiated through not taking into account self-consciousness and volition. The postulate is rendered insecure by the allegation that it is unknowable.

Agnosticism, in refusing to place confidence in human faculties for dealing with *all* that concerns man, surrenders thought to a negative and hesitating mood in which the mind fails to do justice to its own contents.

Frequently, in ethics especially, it has seemed possible to have a finally authoritative system apart from religion. If the word be permitted, this position is conveniently described as ethicism. But can the position be established? Has it, as a matter of fact, any support at all in experience? The most ancient and stable civilization of history is probably that of China, and it has been based mainly on Confucian ethics apart from religion.

So, also, Buddhism is sometimes claimed as more an ethical than a religious system. Its central idea includes neither God nor worship, and yet it has been the stay and hope of countless lives. And in Western thought the separation of ethics from religion began as early as Socrates; and an ethical standard and impulse have been maintained apart from religion up to the appearance of modern positivism. Moreover, on the other hand, religious considerations have often appeared quite unproductive of moral activity or progress; as in the case of fanaticism and emotional excesses in all faiths, and in the stagnation of such a faith as Islam.

Yet this empirical test would not be in itself a final proof of validity for non-religious systems, even if it did not fail, as it does, in its application here. The unmoral or immoral tendency of some religious movement may arise as we have seen from inherent deficiency or degeneracy of their particular religious ideas. And such ethical systems as Confucianism, Buddhism, the Socratic schools, and Positivism, should be scrutinized as to their promise of permanence, and as to the implications of any elements in them that make for permanence. It will be found that positivism, while rejecting religion in one form, is, for its own preservation driven to set it up in another form. It sets up the worship of humanity in place of the

worship of God. Socrates, while showing the independent nature and value of virtue, sustained himself in virtuous courses by belief in God and the guidance of an inner Spirit (δαίμων), and there is a strong element of piety in the background of all his thinking. Then again, Buddha was at first reverenced simply as the human teacher that he professed to be, "the Tathagata, he who is like others."* And the older and stricter school of the Hinayana or "small vehicle" Buddhists† made some effort to keep disciples to the narrow way of an impersonal and purely ethical system. But human nature could not long be restrained from elevating the great Teacher to the rank of deity and worshipping him. The Mahayana, or "Great Vehicle," provided later Buddhism with a rich variety of religious ideas and devotional practices. Buddhism failed, and is failing now, in precisely those features which do not minister to man's need of worship; while it maintained itself and still, in such a region, for instance, as Burmah, thrives, by associating its ethics with worship, prayer, and a religious conception of the relation of the soul to Deity.

And Confucianism, while certainly lasting long as a purely ethical system, has really been at all

* Rhys Davids, "Buddhism," p. 79.

† H. Hackmann, "Buddhism as a Religion."

times buttressed from without, so to speak, by widely surviving practices of primitive animism, by the religious elements of Taoism, and, since a very early date, also by imported Mahayana or "worshipping" Buddhism. To-day it is being permeated with higher ideas and gradually superseded by the Christian ethics in which a full relationship with religion is expressed. Moreover, in the ancestor-worship of the Chinese the religious roots of morality have all along found soil of a sort sufficient for some nutriment. The validity of any system of ethics must ultimately rest, however, not on any partial and empirical test, but on its adaptation to the whole nature and history of man as he moves to the realizing of his highest ideals. His intellect, his will, his desire, must all have their place in the testing of the truth. But the intellect will not easily be restrained from pressing its attention beyond the limits of "law" to the metaphysical problem of what underlies law, that is, to the religious problem of the character of the absolute spirit. And the will in its spontaneity still seems to need a Higher Will upon which to lean and by which to save itself from caprice.

And, again, the desires when normal tend towards an even higher, and finally towards a Highest object. A full test of validity must be adapted to all these movements of the human

spirit, and will thus be at once rational, empirical, and spiritual.

While ethicism would simply neglect the religious principle, there is a naturalism which aims definitely at excluding religion, as useless and even harmful, if not demonstrably false. In the somewhat weakened form of secularism this is a preference given to the duties of this world over duties pertaining to the "next." One world at a time is sufficient, and the present is the nearest and most clamant, demanding all our attention. Natural science is man's only providence, and should alone be studied and trusted. It is intelligent work that saves, not prayer. Man has an adequate morality independent of religion. There is no real connection between morals and religion, and they are better apart; at least morality, as purely human and natural, is better apart from the obscurities of religious faith. The standard by which all must be tested is utility, and secularism sees no utility in religion. These are the milder negations of this mode of thought.

In its more rigorous statement naturalism holds that nature, as we know it, is something with which the idea of a Divine cause cannot be legitimately associated; that religion, in fact, is contradicted by natural science. And that there is contradiction must be admitted, if the Divine cause

be represented as crude miracle acting on nature entirely from the outside. But if the Divine cause be represented as working in and through the uniformity of nature, God stands revealed in natural processes as their principle of energy and order. And this reconciliation of Divine and natural still holds good (as we recognized in the previous chapter) when the two are not absolutely identified but when the Divine is regarded as dominating the natural by higher power and purpose than are at any given moment revealed in the natural. Divine causation, indeed, if the idea is to have any reality, must be conceived as going beyond while working in and through natural causation. God, to have reality as God, must be transcendent as well as immanent. Merely to identify God with nature would result, for thought, quite as logically in the losing of nature in God with Pantheism as in the losing of God in nature with naturalism.

The value of the position assumed in naturalism is the convenience and stimulus it affords for rendering into clear and definite knowledge the contents of the physical world. It is justifiable as a temporary self-denying ordinance with a view to ultimate self-realization. There is a pre-scientific phase in which the mind is conscious only of isolated, particular objects. That there is any

systematic connection between these objects is only gradually apprehended. The curiosity and questioning with which the expanding mind approaches the world are the almost unconscious working of the mind around the lines of necessary connection in things and thoughts. These lines of necessary connection in course of time become clearer to consciousness, and, in the scientific phase, they are recognized as "laws," rendering the details of the universe into intelligible and definite objectivity for us. The sphere is that of nature interpreted by law. Naturalism, however, up to this point neither completes nor accounts for the process which within certain limits it successfully promotes. It cannot account for its own categories. It can do no more with the ultimate question, for instance, as to cause, than to assume a doubly illogical "first" cause in the region of the "unknowable." Nor can it explain the nature of any cause at all. It is concerned exclusively with the objective aspect of things. And yet when this excluding of their subjective aspect is insisted on, even that objective reality for thought becomes obscure again. The outline is made definite, but it becomes the outline of a shadow. The subjective element in knowledge must be recognized ultimately, thus even in natural science, if natural science is to deal with its object fully. Naturalism pressed consistently,

even along its own lines, in the end must take a positive instead of a negative attitude towards what lies implicit within its definitions. As immanent in natural cause, and yet at the same time transcending it, the Divine is recognizable as the ground and explanation of the natural. The two are neither antagonistic nor identical. "All is law, yet all is love." Not, however, as a simple equality or identity. The Divine is the ground prior to the physico-natural, and it is also the ultimate beyond the scope of the physico-natural. Love is not inconsistent with law; but it must be regarded as identifying itself with law only to make an instrument of law for the fulfilling of a purpose for which law in itself is not fully adequate. If God is love, Divine causation must be regarded as identifying itself with natural causation only to make of it an instrument for Divine purposes for which nature in its narrower limitation is in itself not fully adequate. The spiritual purpose in nature is a very real control of nature, actually diverting and rearranging processes and yet without violence to natural cause and effect. The Divine Will is, in fact, comparable to the human will in its freedom to divert, rearrange, or initiate processes along natural lines.

Another line of challenge, and in the main a negative movement, notwithstanding its name,

positivism, is the attempt to erect a system of knowledge on the assumption that sense-phenomena constitute the entire material and range of true science. It is true that, taken in its entirety, Comte's theory, "like every intelligible view of the world, involves a metaphysic and ends in a theology";* but it begins with explicit disavowal of both metaphysics and theology in the accepted sense, and thus it denies both the soul and God. Comte recognizes the gap left by these negations and would fill it in his own way. He attempts to systematize knowledge in a *subjective* synthesis, that is to say with humanity, instead of the Universe, or God, as the ultimate principle. He would "present a systematic view of human life as a basis for modifying its imperfections." He is a pragmatist, and of his humanity he would make a new Supreme Being to replace the old. "If we insist upon penetrating the unattainable mystery of the essential cause that produces phenomena there is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed from wills dwelling in them or outside them. . . . This was the only mode that satisfied the reason until men began to see the utter inanity and inutility of all search for absolute truth. The order of nature is doubtless very imperfect . . . but it is far more compatible

* Edward Caird, "The Social Philosophy of Comte," p. 64.

with the hypothesis of an intelligent will than with that of a blind mechanism."* But is it epistemologically correct to say, with Comte, that we know only phenomena? And what are material phenomena? In any case why use the adjective? Does it not suggest that there *are* other phenomena known to us? If, as the positivist holds, mental states are resolvable into "material" phenomena, and such phenomena are all we know, there is no need for the distinction implied in "material." And this word has at least two theories lurking within it. There is a theory of matter as substance, and a theory of matter as cause. Are these theories phenomena? If they are phenomena they are certainly not material phenomena, nor are they resolvable into material phenomena. Again, the proposal to resolve mental states into material phenomena is in itself not valid. We know our mental states at least as well as we know the outward realities they relate to. And, if any distinction is to be drawn in degrees of comparative certainty, we know the mental states more directly than we know the material phenomena. We know the mind's contents directly, and outward objects only by inference. The latter may be explained away more easily than the former. Even recognizing that mental states must have physical

* Comte, "A General View of Positivism," p. 34.

antedecents and conditions, they are not in themselves physical. There is no passage of physics into consciousness that can account for consciousness.

The inevitable issue of the positivist theory of knowledge is scepticism. If only phenomena are known to the mind, the mind is only a phenomenon to itself; it does not really know itself any more than it knows sequence, cause, connection, law, coexistence and suchlike. Positivism is driven to postulate in things a "permanent possibility of sensation," and in mind "a thread of consciousness." But the permanence and the thread are not fairly to be classed among the phenomena; and if they are known to us, then we know more than is admitted by the hypothesis of positivism. If they are not known to us, on the other hand, we have no knowledge of anything, for without these fundamentals nothing can be construed into knowledge. The positivist definition of phenomena needs to be enlarged so as to include the mental and spiritual facts that go to make up our conscious life, and at the same time it needs to recognize that these facts transcend the purely mechanical limits of the phenomenal world.

The most considerable in range and persistency of all these negative systems is that of materialism, which denies the reality of mind apart from matter, treating it as a mere attribute or function

of matter. Man appears to come into existence by purely mechanical operation of physical laws. He is subject to them at all points, and by them he is sustained and protected. He is at their mercy as he falls sick and dies. He has ideas of higher powers, and fancies himself a free agent, and desires things that he cannot attain to. But he can never get free from the vast machine of the physical world in which his individual life is an utterly insignificant particle. Modern materialism is not advancing in any essential beyond the atomic theory of Democritus, who viewed the universe as constituted by an infinite number of atoms moving in infinite space. The atoms are eternal and imperishable. There is thus no creation and no "end of all things"; there is simply a process of combination and separation of atoms. The amount of force in the atoms, and the number of them, remain stationary through all changes of the structure into which they move. The difference of quality, for example, between water and iron is due merely to the shape of the atoms—water atoms being round and so slipping about each other easily, while iron atoms are jagged and grip each other tightly. The soul is only an inward and more delicate combination of atoms. Thought is only a refinement of sensation, sensation being produced by emanations of atoms from

external objects. As to how atoms move and combine to produce the world, Democritus held that all was according to law and necessity. Falling through infinite space, the various atoms, large and small, round and jagged, light and heavy, infinite in number and in diversity of movement, were bound by their fortuitous combinations and separations to produce just what they have produced. Thus, instead of conscious purpose, he saw in nature only mechanical necessity. Popular conceptions of God he regarded as due to man's incapacity to understand phenomena fully. The ultimate, for Democritus, is expressed simply as *atom*, with its correlative *space*.

Very little modification has been admitted into this statement of the theory of materialism by its later advocates. Aristotle made against it the objection that atoms, falling *in vacuo*, would all fall at the same rate and so would fail to establish combinations. Epicurus admitted this objection; but, to meet it, asserted that each atom possessed a certain spontaneity and was free to deviate from the straight line of its motion. This, he recognized, seems to introduce an incalculable element into the mechanism; but he claimed that the deviation is so slight as to be imperceptible, and that, where it becomes perceptible, the deviation is mechanically calculable.

The modern arguments for materialism are chiefly associatedwith the vast and secure advance which science has made by turning its attention from metaphysical speculation to purely physical investigation. Observation and experiment have opened up innumerable avenues of knowledge which previously were blocked by superstitious or pious beliefs. Chemistry has supplanted alchemy. Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton have established true astronomy against the ecclesiastical dogma of a flat earth. And so forth. The scientific mind has found it fruitful to maintain an attitude of strict objectivity in its investigation of nature. And to infer from this that there is no spiritual principle in nature has seemed easy. Moleschott denies the necessity for recognizing any "vital principle" apart from physical nature: "without matter no force, without force no matter." Büchner asserts the cause of the orderliness of nature to be not God but merely the evolution of matter. Thought is simply a physical radiation set up by external stimuli. Haeckel associates mind with matter at every point, and traces consciousness and volition even in the plants and in separate molecules and cells. Yet, as he leaves mind merely an attribute of matter, the resulting "monism" remains, of course, essentially materialistic. For him there is no problem of the origin of con-

scious mind, or it is shelved as an insoluble problem.

Yet it is to be answered that even physical science builds its structure only with the indispensable aid of the non-physical presupposition of cause. No science is *purely* physical therefore. All science in interpreting or describing nature assumes a uniformity of law, a sequence of cause and effect. This assumption is, on the purely experimental lines of natural science, an assumption incapable of exhaustive demonstration. It is a metaphysical presupposition at the basis of physics. It may be improved, as theistic theories improve it, but it cannot be eliminated, as materialistic theories would eliminate it, without bringing the entire structure of science to the ground. Another argument of materialism is that in physical science no proof of God, or the soul, or immortality is found. The telescope has opened up the starry spaces and finds in them no God. The chemist has exhausted his analysis of the body and finds in it no soul. An eternity seems to attach to substance; but personality appears only to disappear again, a fleeting phenomenon. The realm of secure and demonstrated knowledge extends only so far as the principles of materialism have made their conquests.

Yet, again, have they not made their con-

quests, as we have seen, only by using propositions which are themselves, on materialist lines, indemonstrable? The realm of definite science is not so finally secure as is claimed. And it cannot be made secure until these higher implications are reckoned with.

The movement to a materialistic standpoint has sometimes been justified on the ground that it offers relief from the unreasoning dogma and the intolerable persecutions and injustices of religion. But such a reaction in its very nature can be only temporary and one-sided. The irrationality and the injustices are no real part of the idealist or spiritual theory of the world. If in the name of "free thought" the controlling and unifying principle is rejected under an aspect in which some religious dogma sets it forth, the mind must shortly recognize and restate the principle in some other form.

Materialists claim that man's material condition is necessarily his first, and perhaps, too, his chief or only interest. That "religion never was designed to make our pleasures less" has the implication that this belittling of human joy is exactly what religion has had the effect of bringing about. This supposed miscarriage of religion is made into a plea against spiritualizing and in favour of materializing man's world. Pleasures and solid

advantages should be secured for the race. This hedonism, or utilitarianism, is characteristic of the materialist position on the ethical side, as a crude monism is its characteristic on the intellectual side. The mind's desire to grasp the unity of all things is recognized. The dualism inherent in theological and metaphysical speculation seems to be corrected in the hypothesis which derives all things from a primal cell. All observation of the evolutionary process seems increasingly to confirm this monism —granting only the cell, to start with; and the cell potentially endowed with what is to come from it.

Yet surely this granting of infinite potentiality to the cell is a breakdown of the absoluteness of the monism, and an implicit surrender of the materialist position. A cell so endowed would be not matter but God. The process would be not bare mechanical evolution, but a self-revelation of God in the world and in the spirit of man. When it is asserted that "in matter we have the promise and the potency of all terrestrial life," the terms "promise" and "potency" must be recognized as pointing to the moral and spiritual purpose by the light of which matter itself is alone ultimately an intelligible fact for us.

The spiritual monism into which materialism is on the verge of passing is definitely expressed in Pantheism. Here it is not the reality of God that

is denied but the reality of the world. Matter, *with its potentialities*, becomes the one ultimate reality in which, and for which, alone man and the world have their being; it becomes God. This is a system in which alike mind, matter, and all phenomena are but manifestations of God, who is the one and only Substance.

As an answer to atheism, there is in pantheism some resemblance to the theistic presentation of God as the beginning and the end of all things, and as the controlling and eternal purpose sustaining all intermediate stages and links. But theism cannot merge the world pantheistically in God without losing the reality of God Himself. Reality is constituted by relations, and if the unity is allowed to absorb its relations as mere manifestations of itself, it becomes an unreal unity. When reality is allowed to fall away from the world, and from the soul, it falls away also from God. Pantheism is altogether inconsistent with the nearer and more practical aspects of ordinary experience. In it there is no place for personal freedom, and thus moral distinctions lose force and meaning. If all things are God, nothing can be evil, nothing can be forbidden; and equally, nothing can be good, and nothing need be urged as duty. The spring of all endeavour and of all vigour of character disappears.

It is perhaps sufficiently evident from the fore-

going discussion that these systems which either deny or fail to recognize the function and contents of faith do not satisfactorily establish themselves. As the convictions of individual minds they are forms of intellectualism, and are lacking in the elements of trust and submission which must combine with intellectual perception in the apprehension of reality. They are forms of incredulity. They are not the full movement of personality towards its object. And as systems they are insecure because essentially self-contradictory. They set out to ignore or disprove the idea which all along they unconsciously assume as their support. They are sawing off the branch they sit upon. They are a challenge to faith; but when they are found themselves to be resting upon faith the challenge loses its force.

Scepticism attacks belief, yet itself rests upon a belief in the mind's ability to distinguish truth from error. If this particular belief be dissipated in doubt, as it may consistently be, the very term scepticism loses all meaning. On the other hand, if in this particular belief in the mind's adequacy for its task we must secure an ultimate anchorage from drifting into unreason, and allow scepticism at least provisionally to justify itself, then faith is established as a first principle, and we may proceed to trace its universal action.

Agnosticism rejects belief from any place in the secure structure of science, and would confine the term knowledge to truths empirically tested and thus presumably free from the insecurities of faith. Yet the agnostic believes both in the knowable and in the unknowable as objective elements in thought; though these are not empirically demonstrated as objective. If the agnostic is really rigorous in his rejection of belief he must find that, with its objectivity not securely established, the knowable becomes as insecure as the unknowable is vague. The system breaks down. Yet, on the other hand, if he is not rigorous, but considers that the mind must be allowed to take hold somewhere on its own contents, and a relative agnosticism thus be made possible, this initial act is recognizable as the act of faith, and it introduces an element of faith which permeates all subsequent movement of knowledge.

Ethicism challenges religious faith, and yet itself rests upon assumptions as to duty and destiny which do not maintain themselves, as has been shown, either in theory or in practice, apart from the religious spirit. When the challenge is consistently pressed to the destruction of religion, morality withers as a stem broken from its root. If, however, ethicism frankly demands some basis

in the nature of things, appealing to intuitional, æsthetic, emotional, or "cosmic" impulse, it is there entering the domain of faith, and faith as a first principle is again vindicated. So with naturalism. It would disprove supernaturalism, yet falls to pieces itself without the constructive principles of causal connection that are demonstrably more than nature as naturalism defines it. If these "laws" are really to be trusted at all as ultimate securities of our science, they do not overturn, indeed they actually illustrate, the fundamental inevitability of faith.

Positivism would sweep away metaphysics and theology; and yet it trusts the power of mind to discover sociological laws, and trusts still more the altruistic affections of reverence, love, and benevolence, with which a social order is to construct itself.* That is to say, it trusts the realities about which metaphysics and religion concern themselves. It will use, but it will not seek to know and to understand, these realities. Yet if the Positivist theoretical mistrust were warranted, its practical trust would be unwarranted. If its practical trust is to be sanctioned, the element of faith unquestionably is readmitted to the whole theory of life.

Materialism denies the priority and the indepen-

* Comte, "A General View of Positivism."

dent reality of thought; and yet it affirms itself arbiter and interpreter of the world. How can mere product be judge of the process of which it is product? Consistent subordination of mind to matter must rob mind's theory of matter of any serious importance or validity. And, on the other hand, the assertion of the validity, or even of the permissibility of a theory of matter, is a reassertion of the mind's confidence in itself, and of the elemental movement of faith.

Pantheism challenges faith by denying the distinction between the mind and its object. Yet it holds to the *reality* of its "one and only" substance. If, however, this reality is not to slip away into the *Maya*-illusion of Vedantism, a distinction must be maintained, and must be trusted, between the knower and the known. Pantheism, in order to establish itself even provisionally and relatively, must make a non-pantheistic assumption and do homage to some form of absolute personalism.

V

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH AS A VITAL NECESSITY

Faith gives a wider basis for solution of ultimate problems; this illustrated in recent theories: Pragmatism, Value-judgments, Activism, Intuitionism, Pluralism—The idea of God is found indispensable in philosophy and ethics: the three proofs — Religion furnishes reality with a complete interpretation—Conclusion.

I. Faith furnishes a Wider View of Reality

THUS far we have considered three questions respecting faith, namely, How does it work? What is its content? and Is it true? The first is a psychological question, the second an ontological, and the third an epistemological. If these have yielded as result that we may regard faith as a normal and healthy movement of consciousness, that it brings with it a positive and constructive contribution to experience, and that it can face the intellectual challenge as truth, there remains still the fourth question—Is it necessary? Does experience increasingly confirm faith as a necessary

working reality? This is a question of life in its totality, or spiritual life.

Along three lines it may be shown that experience does increasingly bring the confirmation of faith. In the first place, for the solution of ultimate problems faith does not narrow, it widens, the basis of reality, and is thus practically needed. In the specific efforts of philosophy and ethics, the idea of God in some form is found indispensable, and is thus intellectually inevitable. And, finally, as offering not only a vindication, but a complete interpretation of reality, faith becomes established as the spiritual principle and consummation of life, and has for us an ultimate and vital necessity.

A glance at some recent theories in philosophy will show that the modern confirmation is proceeding in the first line. They show that, in discussing ultimate problems, the religious and ethical elements are not easily separable from the purely philosophical; and in the process it incidentally becomes clear that faith instead of obscuring reality is in fact enlarging the field. Indeed these theories may be quoted as illustrating the contention of this thesis, that thought itself is unduly narrowed and imperilled unless faith is given full recognition as a valid constituent of the intellectual process. They fail in thoroughly elucidating their problems because they have been content to leave thought

under more than a suspicion of incompetency. They clear a way out of scepticism by recognizing the practical and spiritual elements in reality, though they partly block it again by an unwillingness to trust the intellect with its full task.

Pragmatism, as in William James's "Will to Believe," sets out to show the "lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith." "Our passional nature not only lawfully may but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds." We must run the risks of believing wrongly rather than, by refusing to believe, close the door on the possibility of the truth being in our option. And Faith may presently bring her own verification. In any case moral questions cannot wait. Science herself consults the heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and the correction of false beliefs are supreme benefits to man. She exercises faith when she bases her conclusions on the uniformity of nature. And personal relationships such as those of love and family life cannot wait for full demonstration of rationality. They must be taken on trust if they are to exist at all. The demands of the social organism in the carrying on of the government, the army, commerce, and so forth, cannot wait for full verification in reason. In all these

matters faith goes far to create the very fact which becomes the object of our knowledge. And the principle applies to religion. While Science says things are, and Morality says some things are better than others, Religion says perfection is eternal, and we are better off, even now, if we believe that. In the possible truth of this religious hypothesis, we are offered a momentous and forced option in which, if the hypothesis be true, we lose the good by waiting, as much as by altogether disbelieving. So religion becomes a personal obligagation to believe what is in the line of our needs. Faith here is of the same moral quality as courage in practical affairs. The willing department of our nature dominates both the conceiving and the feeling departments.

In this James begins with Kant's denial that the great objects of faith can be grasped as objects of intellectual knowledge. He regards all efforts of the mind to formulate these truths as having failed. And, like Kant, he would seek to establish them only as moral postulates. Where, then, are we to look for the secure springs of religious certitude, if not at all in the ordinary processes of the mind? To answer this he turns to F. W. H. Myers's theory of a subliminal consciousness. As in a floating iceberg only one third is visible, the greater part being submerged, so, it is suggested, the greater part of

the contents of the mind are below the level of full consciousness. These submerged contents are memories, surmises, impulses, tendencies, hopes, aspirations, which rise at times partly, but in the case of fundamental truths never entirely, into the light of common day. Our religious emotions and religious convictions have their home here, and come into our conscious life as an invasion, or uprush, from this subconscious region of our being. So we are directed to the unclassified residuum (which science has passed over as worthless), especially in the form of morbid or unusual psychical states, as possibly able to yield evidence of the truth of our religious beliefs. With approval, then, James quotes Myers's conviction, based on the Psychical Research Society's evidence in hypnotism, hallucinations, automatic writing, mediumship, and the whole series of allied phenomena, that

> "Each of us is in reality an abiding, psychical entity far more extensive than he knows, an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The self manifests itself through the organism, but there is always some part of the self unmanifested, and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve."

This subconscious world sends up to us hints not only of a larger self, but of some *other* than

self, some control from outside and beyond ourselves. In James's larger work, Pragmatism, the practical test applied by the volitional principle, is set forth as a full theory of knowledge. Any idea is true if it works, if it satisfies a need, if it leads to a successful experience. The underlying assumption throughout is that of the limitation of intellectual knowledge to certain categories of the understanding. Outside these categories there are, apparently, many realities, but the mind is supposed to be incapable of certifying them as such.

The value-judgment theory of Ritschl, also, starts from the supposed limitation of intellectual knowledge, not admitting that thought is competent to solve its own problem. A twofold process in the mind's appropriation of its sensations is recognized; there is a function of pure intellectual knowledge concerned only with ideas, tending to the construction of theories, and resulting in the exact definitions of science; and, on the other hand, there is a function of knowledge associated mainly with feeling, concerned with pleasure and pain (not, however, of the bare æsthetic perceptions, but of the whole personality as realizing its own fulfilment or frustration), and tending to an estimate of values, which results in the experiences of religion. These two functions are never altogether dissociated in the mind; yet when the former is

given prominence we have scientific knowledge, and when the latter, we have religious knowledge. Science has its own proper sphere in the facts, the laws, the causes, of Nature; but its categories are inadequate to interpret our mental, moral, and social states. They fail to open up the secrets of the soul. They cannot explain the freedom of the will, the light of reason, the authority of conscience, the nature of worship. For these matters it is religious knowledge that operates, and its operation moves in value-judgments. Religious knowledge, for example, is an *estimate*, that the *worth* of man's spiritual personality transcends that of the whole system of nature; that God secures to the believer a dominion over the world through participation in a Divine kingdom; that Jesus Christ must be pronounced Divine on the ground of what He has effected for man's salvation; that moral evil is *sin* because springing from indifference towards Him who is the Benefactor and Governor of human life. Ritschl regards the usual arguments for the being of God, the ontological, cosmological, and teleological proofs, as being outside the realm of religious knowledge because they fall short of the idea of God which is given in Christian experience, and he considers that our knowledge of God can extend only to what God is in His relations to us, not to what God is in Himself. This Ritschlian position

is developed by Herrmann, who explains the objects of Christian faith as falling into another province than that of ordinary knowledge, because these objects are met by our conciousness not merely as a representing or recording agency, but as a consciousness experiencing values and believing in its ability to realize these values. Even in scientific knowledge there are certain conceptions of the "unity" and "intelligibility" of nature which are in a sense value-judgments. And in metaphysics, efforts to interpret are made through ideas which have only the validity of being *worth* something to us. Value-judgments, however, are distinctive of religion because its aim is not so much the idea of unity as that the world is the orderly means by which the highest value of the believer can be realized. As the subject of an unconditional moral law man learns his absolute value, and secures an objective basis in the nature of things. Religious knowledge "serves to complete the moral personality in itself, and to elevate it as a final purpose over the world." It "professes only one certainty—that the blessedness of man is the measure of all actuality." Still further, Ritschl's position is urged by Kaftan who distinguishes the two mental functions —Representation, giving "the picture of another," and Feeling, giving consciousness of ourselves as living beings. Thus all our simple judgments

express either a state of fact, which we represent and which involves a theoretical judgment; or a relation, which we as human beings assume, and which involves a value-judgment. He holds that religion is never the result of our knowledge of the world, but always a result of the attitude our personal interest leads us to assume. It is a practical concern, where values, not facts, ultimately decide; and yet it is objectively valid, its nature being shown in its effects on us.

Dr. Garvie's exhaustive account of these value-judgments in his "Ritschlian Theology" and "Christian Certainty," from which this survey is mainly drawn, traces later developments of the theory in other disciples of the school. Otto Ritschl points out that we exercise faith in God because we expect help from God. We value faith because it gives us confidence that God can and will help us. As childhood has the greatest capacity for value-judgments, so the childlike spirit is the characteristic spirit of religion; and religious impressions are less easily received if the intellectual has been developed at the expense of the emotional and volitional elements in mind. The evidence expressed in value-judgments is continually being verified and vitalized in Christian experience. And if, as exclusively due to Christian belief, the knowledge so attained has not the

universal validity of scientific truth, yet its truth is established by the testimony of history, and by its own implicit and essential hope of final victory. Max Reischle, again, says: "I assign value to an object of which, *on reflection*, I am sure that its reality affords, or would afford, satisfaction to my whole self; and, indeed, a higher satisfaction than its non-existence." What is essential to man's personal existence has warrant of universal validity. But he distinguishes two kinds of propositions of faith. In so far as they merely imply personal conviction they are psychological value-judgments. In so far as they constitute knowledge they are judgments of *trust* directed to the normative Divine revelation; though instead of terming them epistemological value-judgments, as contrasted with psychological, he would use the term *thymetic* to indicate their close relation to the θυμός, the feeling and willing self. Finally, Max Scheibe deals with the objections that, from the side of religion, value-judgments fail to establish the objectivity of religious truth; and that, from the side of science, religious knowledge seems relieved of all obligation to be either intelligible or rational. He claims that although it is by individual feelings that our value-judgments express what is objective in hedonistic, æsthetic, and moral experience, yet it is by a *universal* necessity. For

these things, to be true at all, must be personally experienced. Religion is the consciousness of our humble dependence on God and of our loving communion with Him. Religious judgments affirm not merely effects within us but the causes without. The proper object of faith is not our feeling, but the self-existent God as cause of that feeling. What is religiously valuable would lose value at once if assumed not really to exist. Science excludes the personal consideration, but religion demands it, demands God's existence because it needs Him and as it needs Him. The value-judgment is an individual wish, but the postulate based on it is a universal necessity. In science certainty is altogether based in the object ; in religion it depends on personal choice and experience. Christian truths are not understood by every man who thinks, but only by him who has a sense of their worth to him, personally and individually, in relation to his own salvation.

In his Activist theory of the Spiritual Life, Rudolf Eucken again shares this realistic mistrust of the purely intellectual process, while he insists on the mind's contribution, in some subjective fashion, to the objective structure of outward reality. Thought, he says, is, equally with nature, inconsiderate of man. It asks an unconditional surrender which man will not give. Our

goal of certitude is not in knowledge as a detached truth, but in knowledge as a spiritual life at once ours and more than ours, revealing in the activity of our whole nature at once man and the world, ourselves and the objects we are conscious of. We must not sacrifice the experiences of our personal life to the demands of any intellectual theory. History shows man's fierce *struggle to attain.* Spiritual life can be ours only in virtue of our deed and decision. It is an act of appropriation, an achievement in which the whole life is engaged. So life is no mere evolution. The gains of "development" are but possibilities in spiritual reality. The advance from the natural to the spiritual is an endless task, for life's spiritual quality is not secured, but falls back, the moment it ceases to advance. We are in nature, but for full reality of experience we need to *break away*, by an act of judgment and will, from the sense-basis to the spiritual control of life. The soul must be itself a fighter for truth, not a mere arena of the fight. The most real thing for our consciousness is the universe, not as a thing dehumanized —*i.e.*, uncontrolled by anything outside itself— but as a spiritual fact which becomes vitally ours only in so far as we co-operate in the great task of transfiguring nature into a realm of spiritual ideals. Life moves in two levels, the lower of which, the

natural, is to be reconstituted in values of the higher, the spiritual. The essence of self-consciousness is self-activity directed upon the world. The principle of *personality* is not a mere state apart from the object of knowledge, it is a life of action which includes and transfigures its object. The true spiritual fact is activity, *Thatsache*, a matter of action. And when my action is inspired by an inward ideal of beauty, truth, or goodness, whose action is it? It is at once mine and God's. This deepest immediacy of experience, where spirit comes into direct contact with its own vital principle, is the starting-point for truth. The issue lies not with our analytic reason, but with the energy and sincerity with which we set ourselves to realize our spiritual resources. Meditation may answer questions that meditation arouses, but the problems of a life-process can be solved only by a life-process; and what is needed for certitude is not endless meditation but spiritual heroism. So Eucken applies his principle of activism. Our spiritual life is not built up in peace and security on a given foundation, he says, but doubt and conflict extend right down into the foundation. No progress is possible without some reversal of first impressions. Life is not grounded upon knowledge but knowledge upon life, and life is only achieved by man's struggle to rise above

the natural. Nature, as we see it, really starts from our own thinking. We do not find the world ready-made, but mould it and build it up from ourselves as centres. So religion, grounded in a spiritual consciousness of the immeasurable depths, the sharp contrasts, the mighty tasks of life, does not encourage a mere craving for happiness on man's part. It sets him free from all paltry aims, by giving him a place in the cosmic battle and thus conferring on him a superiority to the world.

Lastly, in Henri Bergson's Intuitionism, once more the purely intellectual process is scrutinized and declared inadequate. All our mental functions, he endeavours to show, have a utilitarian character. They are essentially turned towards action. In "Matter and Memory" he propounds the theory of pure perception as an instantaneous intuition of reality, an outward reality of things corresponding to our inward faculty of exercising action upon things. The brain is concerned not primarily with conscious perception but with motor reaction. To perceive is not simply to know, it is to choose. Physiological facts show that to perceive involves the offering to our centre of consciousness a choice of several possible actions. In response to a given stimulus the brain indicates to our consciousness a number of these possible actions

from among which we choose to exert one. Conscious perception is thus our power of choice reflected from things as from a mirror. Living beings are in the universe just centres of indetermination, the degree of this indetermination being measured by the number and rank of their functions. Thus the presence of these centres of indetermination brings about the suppression of things in which they do not find an interest and the perception of things in which they do. In a world of images the body furnishes the type, through which all must be that can be *for us*. The images turn towards us the side which interests our body. To each other they present all sides at once, but to us only such as our spontaneity picks out. The mental image results from the omission of that in the totality which has no interest for our needs. Consciousness, in regard to external perception, lies in just this choice. So the forming of mental images is limited by the degree of indeterminate action the body is master of. Moreover, this image-forming does not take place *in the brain*. The brain is only an image among other images, and that which contains the image cannot come from the image which it contains. Conscious perception and cerebral movement are doubtless in strict correspondence with each other; and yet the

image is formed and perceived *in the object*, and not in the brain. With our minds we actually reach outside our bodies and touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition. There is no other image than that which is formed in the object itself. And this is what common sense has always supposed was the case. Philosophers have made the mistake of taking the internal process to be the making of the image, whereas the image though given in and with this process does not arise from it. What, then, is consciousness? Perception is accompanied increasingly by memories. Pure perception, however rapid, does occupy moments of duration, so our successive perceptions are never really moments of matter but moments of our consciousness, woven together by memory, which is not matter at all but spirit. The brain retains motor habits; but does not store up what would have to be an utterly inconceivable multiplicity of "images" or recollections in pigeon-holes of the grey matter. These images or recollections are held together by memory, which is not a manifestation of matter. In memory, Bergson maintains, we get a glimpse of spirit, revealing something more than that which is actually given in the material world. Pure perception gives us the essential reality of matter; but memory, which increasingly from the

forming of the first perceptions appears and becomes their associating principle, is in itself a power independent of matter.

It can be urged against each of these four theories of knowledge that, following the negative suggestions of Kant, they have framed too narrowly their conception of the intellectual aspect of knowledge, thus relinquishing a basis for reasonable certitude which they do not again fully recover. Pragmatism narrows the range of the verifiably true to what we find to be practically useful, assuming that nothing can be finally verified unless it belongs to the sphere of outward nature. It regards our inner life as at best an option or venture more or less in the dark. And, thus, instead of showing a secure basis for the mind's confidence in itself, James's theory only further shakes this already disturbed confidence, and pleads somewhat unconvincingly for a transfer of the mind's trust from what is clearly present in consciousness to what is presumably lying hidden in the mind's unexplored residuum. But where the mind falls short of reality the true line of advance in the investigation is not to less but to more vitality; not to a subconscious but rather to a superconscious phase, to something not below but above the ordinary consciousness, and to which thus the mind consciously aspires. The

theory of the subconscious is a seeking of the living among the dead.

Ritschl, in his value-judgments, similarly, while conceding to *scientific* knowledge within its own realm a final validity, does not succeed in securing as much for the objects of faith; nor does he even claim for these any place in science. Yet if they are to be grasped only in a "feeling" of value not altogether clear intellectually, they inevitably fall to an inferior grade as knowledge. It should be maintained that science while it never exhausts also never can totally exclude the personal factor which is involved in the objective basis of knowledge. And Christian truths, whether fully understood or not, must still be truths for thought, and relatively demonstrable *as thought* to all who think.

Eucken's activism, equally, comes as an unnecessary disparagement of reason. It urges us to get on with duty without recognizing that our nearest duty sometimes is to *think*. It suggests that we cannot hope to be certain of spiritual things till we have done them; though, by the way, we never shall have quite done them. We can be certain of age-long strife, but not of final victory; we can realize the actuality of work, but not its completion. This to recommend to us the strenuous life in place of what we are seeking—namely, something

on which to sustain the strenuous life when we grow weary in it. The spiritual life surely needs the peace of God on which to rest its incessant effort. True, this peace is not fully assured in the purely intellectual process. But neither is it assured in the purely practical movement of conscious life. And it is rendered not more secure but less, if confidence in the competency of thought for its own problems be shaken. And finally, is thought so totally "inconsiderate of man," seeing it is thought that conducts Eucken himself into this larger problem of Spirit? Rather say that thought, while adequate to the expression of its own unity, points man to something more than itself, to some completer unity of living spirit.

And Bergson's Intuitionism has in it something of the same impatience towards reflective thought, and the same disparagement of the logical functions of consciousness. "There are certain powers around our conceptual and logical thought made of the very substance out of which has been formed the luminous nucleus that we call the intellect." But if this something, deeper and fuller than intellect, is already present, thus, in the very substance of intellect as we know it, a luminous nucleus, why not expect more and get more out of the intellectual process?

A more satisfying account of the mind's activity

in knowledge is to be found, after all, in Hegel's interpretation of the categories, not as final limits within which all intellectual knowledge must lie, but as the necessary differentiation of the unity of self-consciousness. Hegel carries the unity of knowing and being to a complete identity. In the reality of self-consciousness the opposition between the self and the not-self is relative. Self *against* the not-self is suicidal; but self in and through the not-self gives a higher assertion and realization of self. Spiritual life is a continual dying. Every step in it is won, as Eucken rightly claims, by a *break* with that immediate or natural self which is opposed to the not-self. And for this reason spiritual life cannot die. It can make that which most seems to limit it a part of its own life. It can take up death into itself as an element. This is the truth of Christian mysticism and of all deep Christian life. "He that saveth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life shall save it," is the first distinct expression of the exact nature of spirit. The individual must die to an isolated life, in order to live the universal, spiritual life. For, as in intellectual life we exist for ourselves only as other things and beings exist for us, so in practical life we live for ourselves only as we live for other ends and beings than ourselves. This is a principle under which we must in some measure

live if we are to live as rational beings at all. So Caird* states the Hegelian Intellectualism in which the oppositions of faith and science, trust and proof, ideal and actual, are reconciled, not by holding the process of intellect back, but by pressing it forward to claim the whole ground of reality. The question that intellect asks can be answered only by intellect, though the answer urges us into a still more comprehensive process than the intellectual. And obviously this position does not exclude James's "practical and satisfying" uprush from another sphere; nor Ritschl's value-judgments; nor Eucken's break from the natural into the spiritual; nor Bergson's plunge into the nature and mood of living things; though it withholds the disturbing concessions that these writers make to the supposed incapacity of the mind to grasp the greater truths.

It must be acknowledged that these recent writers have brought a fresh sense of motion and life into a problem that, when stated in Hegel's cold completeness of thought, seemed lifted out of touch with the needs of the time. They have found expression for some of the elements in a more comprehensive objectivity than that of pure thought. Life is always larger than our clear knowledge of it at any given moment. The part

* E. Caird's "Hegel."

we do not clearly know we can nevertheless grasp at, and use, and bring increasingly within the range of clear knowledge. The highest thoughts that come to us—God, the soul, immortality—even if not quite clear, have thus at once a working value and an intellectual reality for us. The call to a good and useful life springs from the same source and is of the same nature as our knowledge of anything; it has the same kind of certainty. Objective validity is not, in any matter, religious or scientific, constituted by the satisfaction of our logical faculty as isolated from our other conscious powers. It comes from the logical faculty working along with the other faculties; and even, while it has its own freedom in its own domain, working in a certain subjection to them for the solution of the full problem of our conscious life.

This recent movement, in other words, is passing from the philosophic standpoint to the standpoint of morals. And it is claiming, and rightly claiming, that the latter standpoint gives not a less complete, but a more complete, interpretation of life. Pure philosophy can set forth life only as thought. Moral or practical philosophy sets forth life more fully as at once thought and action. Pragmatism, the Value-judgment theory, Activism, and the new Intuitionism, while not advancing

the main positions of metaphysics (which also, by the way, they do not succeed in undermining), furnish a valuable development of the ethical element that is latent in the Hegelian conception of Absolute Spirit. And they point to the need for the fully personal and spiritual movement of religious experience as the ultimate factor in Reality.

Some advance in this direction is perhaps to be found in Professor Ward's interpretation of Pluralism* as marking the philosophic limitations which faith widens. The first requirement of philosophy, he says, is organic coherence. Philosophy cannot have two independent growing-points, and, so long as experience is the one we start from, there can be no finality about philosophy. We must start not with any absolute Unity, either monistic or theistic, but with the realities of self and the world. We have Unity as a centre, yet we cannot from that speculative centre survey the world. To attempt to do so only results in lowering the idea of the world without raising the idea of God. From the point of view of man God is spirit, and personal, yet not in such a way as to deprive us of personality. For us the world at first is in part contingency, in part stability, in part progress, and

* James Ward, "The Realm of Ends."

all these are involved in our experience as epigenetic. And progress is slow because every jot and tittle of it must be learnt by experience. But faith is foreshadowed in the upward striving which is the essence of life. "A freckle, or pigment-spot is all that light at first produces; but when its hints are heeded, and the pigmented retina that first arose is furnished by the organism's own prophetic efforts with directing muscles, it exchanges its passive sight for active vision, and opens out a vastly wider objective world. On the higher plane faith . . . contrasts with intellectual sight . . . faith is striving, and striving is faith. . . . The whole conscious being is concerned . . . not merely the cognition of what is, there is also an appreciation of what it is worth, a sense of promise and potency of further good that it may unfold; there is a yearning to realize this; and there is, finally, the active endeavour that such feeling prompts." Philosophy in itself, thus, when interpreting the Universe strictly in terms of mind, appears necessarily pluralistic; and yet we may secure its goal of coherence and unity by the help of faith. It is faith, not philosophy, which can secure for experience the universality, survival, and progress we are seeking.

But it may be urged that faith is not something to be brought in, as it were from the outside, to

the help of philosophy. It is rather to be recognized as already an inner element of philosophy, the root and spring of mind itself. So that philosophy is really not driven to this self-denying ordinance of pluralistic modesty for the attainment of its goal. If philosophy starts from experience, and experience at bottom is experience of God, then philosophy after all has a finality which is already assured, although awaiting a fuller unfolding at each stage of the advance of human experience.

VI

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH—(*Continued*)

II. The Idea of God is found to be Indispensable in Philosophy and Ethics

BUT, further, in the study of Reality it may be shown that faith does more than widen the basis, it supplies the central and illuminating idea. Thus a second line of confirmation comes in the intellectual inevitableness of the idea of God in the constructive efforts of thought at interpreting the Universe. Theism has elaborated the three well-known arguments from admittedly objective reality—the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological; and a brief consideration of these will sufficiently indicate that without the idea of God, thought cannot reach its goal; and, even where apparently indemonstrable, the idea asserts in some way its necessity. Philosophy must assume a correspondence between subjective intelligence and objective reality, between man as intelligent and the world of reality as intelligible.

The cosmological proof is that the mind neces-

sarily attributes a cause to every effect, and asks what is that Cause of which the whole Universe is the effect? On the other hand, as every cause is open to be regarded as an effect of some prior cause, even this Final Cause to which the mind directs inquiry is, as *mere* cause, unsatisfying. The mind cannot rest in the alleged finality without some fuller explication of the nature of the Uncaused Cause. The intuition of Cause is essentially an intuition of Something Absolute, behind or in phenomena, and it is not sufficiently rationalized by reference merely to the phenomena of antecedent and consequent. Kant's criticism of this proof was that from our experience of existence we are logically entitled to infer something equal to existence, but we are not entitled to infer something greater than existence—that is, we are not entitled to infer God. The cause must be assumed to be as great as the effect; it cannot be shown to be greater.

A fuller statement of the argument becomes possible in connection with volition. The human will in operation is a display of conscious causal activity really originating, though under limitations. This conveys to us something of the Absolute Causality which, though in us, is not originated by us. We have a power of origination, but we are not conscious of originating that power itself. There is something in us, thus, that is from beyond

and above ourselves, and indicates not something less but Something greater. As nothing is conceivable greater than Personality, this Higher than ourselves is conceivable as the Absolute or Infinite Personality.

The most widely discussed proof is the Teleological, the argument from Design. A general form of the argument is in the line of Butler's plea for the significance of analogy. He claimed that the difficulties of revealed religion are similar to the difficulties that face us in ordinary experience, so that we are no more warranted in rejecting revelation than in rejecting ordinary knowledge. With regard to this, J. S. Mill pointed out that analogy is really no proof. Its principle being that "of like things under like conditions like assertions are probably true," full demonstration can never result. It is a mere hint as to probability which can never amount to proof.

The full argument from design, however, goes much farther than this, and culminates in what may almost be regarded as a new and higher proof altogether, that of evolution. The ordinary form of the teleological proof is that evidences of design appear in nature, in man's moral character, and in history. The uniformity of nature as an orderly system indicates that a Designer has arranged or is arranging it. There may conceivably be an

orderly movement which nevertheless indicates no rational design, as that of a windmill which grinds nothing and is not adapted to any discoverable end. This certainly seems to be the way in which some minds regard the Universe. It seems to them orderly enough, but not obviously resulting in anything, or intended to result in anything ultimately. Yet, if the principle of an orderly movement be recognized in connection with the mind and will of *man* as part of nature, the universal application of orderliness begins. For man's mind makes a persistent demand for explanation on the lines of rational orderliness, and his will in practical and moral orderliness implies some valid purpose for everything.

Kant's criticism, again, here points out that the Design argument can at best indicate an Architect of the world, not a morally perfect Creator. The premises must not be held to contain more than we find in the conclusion. Since the world is imperfect we cannot argue from it to any but an imperfect Designer. The proof thus goes no further than to Comte's Grand-Etre of Humanity. The principle is the *homo mensura*, and its universe is only on the scale of human possibilities. It does not demonstrably yield a divine which is distinct from and transcending the human.

Yet for the mind that already on *a priori*, intui-

tive, or practical considerations has accepted the idea of God, there is no difficulty in recognizing in the orderly sytem of nature a more than narrowly human design. The full Divine Character of Kant's Architect or Demiurge, though not evident on a bare survey of details, becomes inferable from a thorough-going interpretation of human experience. The objection on the ground of anthropomorphism is met by the considerations that our human experience of mind is necessarily the starting-point for any conception of God; that the using of means to secure ends is no indication of imperfection in God, but is an inherent condition of creative activity; and that there is no need to conceive of the Creator standing outside His creation as a man is outside his own work. The objections also on the score of alleged blemishes in nature, "red in tooth and claw," cruel, decaying, wasteful, are to be met by replacing the view of immediate by the view of the larger and ultimate purposes that are being worked out in the general movement of nature. The beginnings are to be interpreted from the end. All details of the process of nature, and the fact of process itself through change and continuity, imply from this point of view that a spiritual principle is at work on an intelligent plan.

The working of the Moral Sense in man presents

a specially significant aspect of the general argument from Design. The ideals and intuitions of the good life are part of the constitution of man, even when he neglects or disobeys them. The distinction between right and wrong reveals, moreover, a necessary relation between man and the being and nature of God. In the moral sense man finds himself in the presence of a will higher than his own. That certain things ought to be done, or *must* be done, if not a purely instinctive feature of conscious volition, is easily instilled into a child's mind; so easily and so ineradicably, indeed, that the process seems to be an awakening of elements inherent in the volitional power. This susceptibility to command or prohibition is the Moral Sense, in so far as it is concerned with commanding the good and prohibiting the evil. Human authority over the young or the weak, in such matters, is realized by the conscience to be only a delegated authority, representing an inward yet transcendent Will which can be construed as the Will of God. So the moral argument for the existence of God is the inference from the sense of human responsibility. If full weight of praise or blame, or indeed any weight at all, is to attach to human conduct, the explanation of it will rest ultimately—not in the judgment of one's fellowmen, for this is often fallacious; and not in self-

judgment, for Self feels constrained by a law often against its own inclination—but in a law which, while it may be recognized as the true law of one's best nature, is also something more than one's own nature. The recognition of a Higher Will is needed thus, as the only adequate impelling authority in morals. We are free to do right, to do the will of Him whose service is perfect freedom. It is the vindication at once of God and of the Soul as realities in essential relation the one with the other.

A somewhat neglected branch of the Design argument is the appeal of the Beautiful. Plato* defines the Highest Good as τὸ καλόν, and says, in the "Symposium":

"To arrive at this perfect Beauty we must begin with the forms of beauty that we see down here, and, with our eyes fixed on the Beauty Supreme, unceasingly raise ourselves as we pass, so to speak, through all the degrees of the scale, from a single beautiful bodily form to two such forms, from two to all the others; from beautiful bodily forms to beautiful sentiments; from beautiful sentiments to noble knowledge: until from knowledge to knowledge we arrive at a perfected knowledge which has no other object than the beautiful itself; and we end by knowing it in its own nature."

Later thinkers have not given such prominence to the æsthetic argument, and some have even

* *Cf. supra*, p. 24.

excluded it as an incidental or purely subjective consideration.* It has thus been left mainly to painters, sculptors, musicians, poets, preachers, and to the common intuitions of human nature, to maintain that "we needs must love the Highest when we see it" in the form of the Beautiful.

Yet so universal a trust has surely some rational basis. Exactly in so far as beauty is perceived it is desired. To possess it by enjoying it in some way, is a satisfaction to the self, and a self-realization, implying something elemental and ultimate in the relation. Extravagance in dress springs from a love of pretty things quite as much as from desire to attract attention. Beauty is, in fact, a correlative of desire. All that is desired, is desired because of some beauty more or less clearly perceived in it. Beauty is that objective quality which evokes our desire and confers pleasure upon us. People speak of a beautiful pudding, meaning little more than its sweetness, and its vanilla flavouring. A mechanic will speak of a beautiful gas-engine, meaning its neat look and efficient movement. These are as true perceptions of a certain ultimate reference to our desire in things, as when we speak of a beautiful thought, a beautiful action, a beautiful spirit, a beautiful character. If towards an

* Caldecott and Mackintosh, "Selections from the Literature of Theism," p. 305 ff.

object the soul feels no drawing of desire at all, it is because no aspect of beauty is perceived in that object. "When we see Him, there is no beauty that we should desire Him." If desire arises, it is because some beauty, previously unseen, is now perceived.

The Christian view seems to move far away from the Greek worship of the externally beautiful. But it modifies the centrality and finality of the Greek idea only provisionally, and in connection with the fact of sin, and of the deceitfulness of sin. Plato, indeed, recognized in external beauty an element of peril, in his view of Art as a "noble untruth," a truth of idea expressed through a falsehood of fact. Christianity defers the worship of the external presentation of Beauty only to secure a more perfect expression of the principle. It is really the highest spiritual beauty, all along, that sin should be under process of redemption. It is moral beauty that the life of unselfish service and vicarious suffering should be lived. It is intellectual beauty that the illusion of mere surface conditions and the guile of Satan himself "fashioned as an angel of light" should be exposed. If these are at first the less obvious manifestations of the principle, they are ultimately its fuller vindication. In religious experience, beauty asserts itself in the transition from goodness to love; from the law

that was given by Moses to the grace and truth that came by Jesus Christ; from duty, as the "stern daughter of the voice of God," to life, as delighting in God and enjoying Him for ever. If the trinity of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, is to stand as fully expressing the ideal, then the Beautiful must be understood as the phase of fully personal union between the soul and its object, finally issuing in the "beatific vision." It is no mere third, and no narrow æstheticism: it is a higher reality, which does not exclude the true and the good, but fulfils itself through them. Ruskin finds it to be "something Divine, either the approving voice of God, the glorious symbol of Him, the evidence of His kind presence, or the obedience to His will, by Him induced and supported."* The ultimate meaning of the Beautiful in nature and in man is that God desires us, and by revealing to us His glory, would draw us to know and to love Him.

One other form of the teleological proof is the argument from History. The record of civilization shows the development of a social structure more perfect than as planned by any individual or period, and reveals thus the unfolding of a Divine purpose. Also, in the retribution which we can trace overtaking one generation with the consequences of the

* "Modern Painters," vol. ii.

sin of an earlier, as well as in the good results, which we see flowing to a later generation from the virtues of an earlier, we must acknowledge a continuity of moral principles in the experience of the race as a whole.

Darwinism is often reckoned to have destroyed the older forms of the general argument from Design. It used to be urged that design implies a designer as obviously in the case of a man's ear being designed by God for the man's hearing of sweet music, as in the case of a watch being designed by a watchmaker for the telling of the correct time. Of course the implication is not so obvious. For in the case of the watch there is no indication of any spontaneous automatic contribution of the watch to its own making, or any evidence of the action and reaction between the parts of the watch and their environment as contributory to the design. While in the case of the human ear, as in the case of any part of living organic nature, there is evidence of slow and progressive adaptation in which the organism itself co-operates with the environment. There is no direct act of God traceable in nature completing a perfect work. On the contrary, no part of nature is found to be strictly and finally a perfect work, as one might expect a work of God to be a perfect work. What we see in nature is effort, and, in a

sense, perpetual failure rather than success. The ear has a quite limited range of hearing, and human inventiveness has had to assist it with microphone and megaphone for practical purposes. So the eye, even with spectacles, telescopes, and microscopes, cannot see all it would. Moreover, each natural organ is shown by Darwinism to have come into existence by a process of struggle in which many perish. The argument assumes a negative form when it appears that the eye was not directly planted in man's head, but only came by the more rapid *dying out* of creatures in whose heads the sensitive eye-spot was less sensitive than in their neighbours. Survival of the fittest appears a purely automatic process in which the destruction of the unfit bulks more largely than any adequate "Divine" achievement.

Yet Darwinism, strictly, confines itself to observation of the processes, and does not ask the ultimate questions as to the Cause and the Purpose of nature. While it throws on the immediate causes of natural phenomena a fresh light which renders obsolete the form in which the Design argument used to be stated, it does not exclude Design altogether. Indeed, the fact that at all points, notwithstanding reversions and failures, there are tendencies and orderly processes revealing uniformities of law, shows indication of Design on

a universal scale. Not conclusively perhaps; but while Darwin hesitated to acknowledge, he felt unable to deny the evidence for a comprehensive universal Design in nature.

And, at best, the argument from Design cannot be in the full sense conclusive, for it is an inference from the less to the greater, from Creation to Creator; and as such it is an argument that may confirm, but cannot compel, faith in God. If on fuller grounds the mind has accepted God, the lines of natural evolution show the argument set out in more satisfying form than before; and at the same time the earlier form is seen to err only in brevity and abruptness, not in its main intention.

These "three proofs"—Cause, Design, and Identity—are perhaps best regarded as a simple system of which the parts dovetail into each other. They are really one continuous inference from nature, from man as part of nature, and from thought as part of man. Nature as an effort implies a Cause; the transitory aspect of the world implies a permanent Something. This in itself, however, is not a conclusive inference. It is negative rather than positive in character. The finitude of the world implies an infinitude, but indicates no definite content in the latter idea. So a further stage is the Design of the world. Nature is seen to work in an orderly fashion for the accomplish-

ment of a purpose. The nature of the first cause is seen to be that of an intelligent Power. Yet this, as logical inference, still falls short of demonstration of the existence of God. An external Designer of the world would still be limited by the limitations of His material. While the world is left in any sense outside God, He can hardly be represented as possessing infinite perfection. The idea of Design may therefore be extended to representing the Universe as one organic process of the Divine unfolding, or evolution. This extension of the idea of God as the inner life and reason of all things is immediately an inference not from creation but from thought, though it is the thought that creation gives rise to. In a sense this Divine core is implicit in the Universe from the beginning; but it becomes explicit and available for us only in the fuller expression of the Universe—its blossoming, so to speak, in human thought. It is a presumption at once *a priori* and *a posteriori*, in the light of which the world as we know it from experience becomes intelligible throughout. Moreover, to infer Divine Will and Purpose from the Character of Creation is still to leave the relation between God and the world purely an arbitrary one. There is need to include in the conception of the Divine Being a recognition of His nature as necessarily exhibited in the world.

This is expressed in the argument from the necessity inherent in the idea. This ontological proof is primarily stated as that, in man's thought of God, the existence of God is, as a necessary attribute, implied. The objection is that the whole argument is in the realm of ideas, and means simply that in the idea of God the idea of His necessary existence is implied. There is no real passage to the objective reality of existence. Yet while in particular thoughts the idea of a thing may not imply the necessary existence of the thing, as the thought of a dollar in the pocket need not imply the reality of a dollar in the pocket, there is in the thinking principle an identity of thought with reality, an identity that finds expression in some ideas; and this ontological proof belongs to this class of ideas that are necessary or identical truths. There is something in our thought which is not merely our individual thought. We can think the non-necessity of our own individual thought; but in doing so we are thinking from the point of view of universal thought; that is to say, there is in our thought something of the Absolute Thought. Our conscious life is based on a Universal Life which is no merely subjective notion, but carries with it the proof of its necessary existence. God conceived as Infinite Mind, as that Universal

Self-Consciousness on which our conscious life is based, Whose nature it is to reveal Himself in Creation and in Man, is the ultimate and necessary inference that Reason makes from its own existence and the world's.

VII

THE CONFIRMATION OF FAITH—*Continued*

III. It furnishes to Reality a Complete Interpretation

THE third line of confirmation is that faith, while itself an indispensable constituent of Reality, also furnishes to Reality an interpretation that is complete, in the sense that it is fundamental, final, and universal.

To interpret life as a philosophy, or as an ethical effort, is to reduce it from a fully concrete to a partly abstract expression of Reality. For although in philosophy thought has its own objective validity, and is thus still in a sense concrete, it presents concretely only the intellectual aspect of the totality of Being; the other aspects it presents abstractly, if it presents them at all. And ethics, while it presents concretely the intellectual and the practical aspects combined, is still abstract in respect of its own ultimate authority and aim. But the spiritual life

as religion is an interpretation of a fully concrete experience of Reality, and it is a complete interpretation of that experience. Religious faith, while utilizing to the full both philosophy and ethics as vehicles of its message, brings to these as their complement at once inner and environing, a Spirit eternal and Divine. Life needs to be religious in order to be understood and in order to be rightly lived; and as religious it is in the way of being completely understood and of being perfectly lived. How then, for the purposes of religion, are we to be assured of the reality of the Eternal and Divine Spirit? Sometimes it is claimed that spiritual experience, in the form of sentiment or impulse apart from any conscious rational process, is sufficient to establish the validity of belief or worship. And to some extent the claim must be admitted. A purely rational demonstration of the reality of Spirit cannot be the earliest phase of religion. Real and valid processes must be at work in our experience long before they become susceptible of full logical vindication. And religion as an active relation of the soul to God will probably never fully detach its demonstrations as a purely intellectual proof apart from practical experience. But there is from the outset a self-evidencing validity in religion.

In any religious experience, even in the form

of sentiment or impulse, the reality of the object *is* presented, although only intuitively. The soul alongside its own finitude is conscious of the Infinite. This is a working demonstration of the reality of the Infinite. And as such it is a more cogent proof than pure theory can give. In belief, the appeal of conscience and the light of inward vision actually possess a distinct objective value. And in worship, our prayer, both by its impulse and by its experienced efficacy, brings an objective corroboration of faith.

Yet spiritual experience for its interpretation must be extended from that of the individual to that of others and of the whole race. The individual comes into clear apprehension of his own experience only in his conscious distinction from others, and thus in his conscious association with them. In regard to the reality of God as distinct from self, and as thus associated with self, the individual must reckon with the failures or the successes of others as well as with his own. This will lead to more complete objective presentation of the proof as an elucidation of the experience of the race. Yet experience is always something more than its own elucidation. Reason can conduct us, from the practical question as to whether our experience is real, to the intellectual question whether it is true; but there remains the spiritual

question, which includes the other two and goes further, the question whether our experience is eternal life. And this last question recognizes once more the close unity of the soul with its object, as a unity which, though imperilled by the abstract nature of the thought-process, ought never to be lost.

Then there is the universality of the spiritual experience. By religion we mean something that is essentially universal. The derivation of the word from *relegere*, to gather together, or from *religare*, to bind back, to fasten, suggests the fundamental relation of man to God which emerges as "the belief in spiritual beings," "the mental apprehension of the Infinite," "the inscrutable Power behind consciousness," "the feeling of dependence," or "the sense of need," as religion has been variously defined. It is thus by every definition in some sense a relation between man and the Divine principle of the Universe. Even where men are unconscious or imperfectly conscious of this relation it must be regarded as implicit and capable of development.

Still more is the universality of religion evident when we consider not merely the term itself, but that psychological necessity of consciousness in man which occasions the use of such a term. Religion, while it is more than thought, reveals

its presence as an ultimate constituent in the analysis of thought. Self-consciousness holds in its unity of thought not only the self and the outward object, but a third element, a Higher Something, in relation to which the self and its object both stand. This third element or background is a more or less explicit consciousness of the infinite. The self and the not-self are opposites and must remain opposites. Yet, equally, they are seen to be each indispensable to the other. They are each an expression of some higher third element from which they spring, by which their independence is limited, and in which they find their mutual reconciliation and meaning. This higher Unity, in which subject and subject thus find at once their combination and their fullest individuality, is the Infinite, which along with the World and the Soul, lies implicit in every moment of rational self-consciousness. It comes into clearness only on reflection, yet is present as the implicit presupposition of all thought. While unawakened it can hardly be said to constitute religion. And there may be people in whom it is either unawakened or in some way suppressed. And thus the universality of religion is in part latent, and is not realized in the sense of actually showing itself in every human being. And, moreover, it

is not simply in the relation to the Infinite, but in that relation becoming conscious and active that religion consists. Yet, implicitly at least, religion is as universal as thought. God is as real to man as man is to himself. Early stages of the growth of man's conscious rational life, such stages as we see in savage tribes and low civilizations, do not exhibit the three elements in the unity of thought as elements separately realized by the primitive mind itself. To the savage as to the young child knowledge is a very confused unity in which the distinctions are only slowly appearing. But man always is more than he is distinctly conscious of being. And even the primitive consciousness, if looked back upon from a later stage when the mind is able to reflect and analyze, can be seen to possess the rudiments of the threefold distinction in every act of knowledge. There is a consciousness of the outer world for which *in part* the thinker finds place in his mind. There is *in a measure* the distinction between the thinker himself and the thing he knows; as he knows the thing, he knows also himself as distinct from it. And there is his sense of dependence and desire, his effort at self-aggrandizement, erecting "himself above himself," dimly moved, not by the object merely,

but by some higher reality in which his relation to the object seeks its meaning.

It has not, as a matter of observation, been found easy to establish any instance among primitive or degenerated peoples of this consciousness of the Divine being either entirely undeveloped or entirely suppressed. Such tribes though often reported at first to be without religion, have been so reported generally because of the first difficulties in effectively communicating with them. It has afterwards, in nearly all cases, been established that they have beliefs in some kind of spirit-power and have thus a rudimentary religion.

And throughout history the religious consciousness has not only shown itself, but it has shown itself as the most widespread and persistent phenomenon affecting human well-being. When philosophy arises, religion, not being purely a problem for thought, retires from the immediate arena of the discussion, and may seem to disappear altogether or to re-enter only incidentally. But it invariably has reappeared when thought has faced its ultimate questions. The search for the unifying principle of the world, from Thales onward, shows the root of theism secure in the mind's movement, and shows that root not infrequently in a vigorous, if somewhat premature,

blossoming. For Socrates the universals of thought were recognizable as expressions of the Divine in man. For Plato, with his Divine ideas as the reality of which material things are but shadows, the beginning and the middle and the end of all things is God. He holds that "there can be no science of the fleeting." If there be knowledge at all, it must be knowledge of the Infinite. The last reality is God, who is revealing Himself as Supreme Reason, as efficient Cause, as the source of all good, the controlling principle in all law. Plato denounced the foolish and unmoral elements in the popular mythology though he did not completely clear his own conception of God from polytheistic associations. But to him the Supreme Spirit appeared as essentially intelligent and moral personality. God is the Maker of the world, the Father of men, the Ruler of all things. Matter is a sort of second and subordinate principle into which, in order that it may be efficient, God infuses an intelligent "soul." Over even the material world God is thus conceived as exerting an infinite providential care.

Aristotle, with still more systematic elaboration, set forth the same fundamentally religious principle. The Divine is for him the one reality out of which all the rational universe springs; it is

the uncaused cause of all things, the goal to which all things move, the home of man's personal freedom and perfection. The neo-Platonists Plotinus and Porphyry, reviving the Platonic emphasis on God as the ultimate Spirit, attempted to combine it with the emphasis which Stoics and Epicureans had preferred to lay on the soul. They represented the soul as able to rise by ecstatic vision into full union with God, union in which all distinction between finite and infinite is lost.

The movement of Greek philosophy, which finally subsides in this neo-Platonic mysticism, gave a vigorous opening to theistic speculation. It did not fully show the relation of God to the world or to the soul; nor did it clearly show the superiority of a monotheistic faith over the old polytheistic systems; nor did it win over its disciples to the religious life in any widespread movement. Its appeal as thought is to the intellectual and speculative tendencies in the mind rather than to the universal needs of men. But in touching the religious problem Greek thought has shown its power to purify crude and unworthy conceptions of religion, and it has offered positive and vigorous support to the mind's confidence in God; though it scarcely reaches the point of view from which it is clear

that it is the *mind's confidence* in God, which at the last resort sustains man's confidence in himself alike for thought and for conduct and for all reality whatsoever.

The medieval thinkers assume the religious standpoint. They treat the problem of the Universe as one in which the solution is already in process of being divinely communicated to man by revelation, or indeed has been already set as a deposit or datum within man's reach by the incarnation of the Son of God. For them the function of thought is simply to expound, and the function of conduct is simply to obey, the revealed will and mind of God. The solution is thus for them completed in terms which involve the surrender of the whole life to God, and relate the entire subjectivity of the soul to its own true objectivity in the Divine. Medievalism is dualistic in its intellectual form, but it offers a working solution of the entire problem. Its religious position supplies a principle of adjustment by which philosophy and ethics are to be brought into their proper relation to one another and to the common goal of all life. The dogmatic forms in which the object of belief was set forth have proved inadequate, but the principle is good. The datum of religion, though not so precisely formulated for all time as scholasticism supposed

it to be, is nevertheless a real and ultimate objectivity for man. And in order to understand, man must begin by believing what is given, at least in the sense of receiving it and acknowledging it, and in a degree thus surrendering himself to it. Without this attitude of trustfulness towards Reality man cannot even apply his tests to it. With it, experience keeps open the path by which, through however so many errors, it may steadily move to its true goal. Scholasticism, while hampered by the current philosophy in its application of the principle of faith, yet did to philosophy the service of reasserting and replacing this principle, even if dualistically, as essential in a full scheme of truth.

And, as many modern movements of thought are tending to show, the religious or highest standpoint is identical with that of personality. Religion gives us the universe interpreted through personality, and the universe as itself expressing ultimately the Absolute Personality. By Absolute Spirit, into which even the process of pure thought conducts us, there is indicated, not thought merely, but this higher category than thought. The treating of things as personal is an early stage, perhaps the earliest, of man's effort to understand the Universe. And Comte is right in asserting, in this sense, that the theological is the first phase of

man's knowledge. But after our distinctions between persons and things have all been drawn and developed, this interpretation through personality reappears. It is not only the earliest but the latest, and, as progressively elucidated, the finally satisfying expression of reality, because it holds secure the unity, while developing the distinction, between God and the soul.

Personality, alike in God and in man, is the keystone of the religious interpretation of the Universe. The objection that personality cannot be affirmed of God without thereby limiting God is met by the consideration that the Divine person is to be conceived, not as limited necessarily but as limited freely—that is, by *self-limitation*. Human personality, while in analogy with the Divine as a free self-conscious and self-controlling principle, is of course not completely in analogy with the Divine. As human, created, and therefore dependent and limited, it can operate only in the sanction of the Divine —that is to say, in some fellowship which the Divine Being permits with Himself. But in the Divine the principle of personality is free from the limitations which necessarily beset the human state. That God can be conscious only in opposition to that which is not God, and that thus the *not-God* limits God, and that thus God's Infinity

and Absoluteness are destroyed, is a statement which overlooks that God is not un-conditioned but self-conditioned and self-conditioning. While personality thus implies limitation, this constitutes no objection against a Supreme Being with whom the limitation is self-limitation and not a necessity imposed from without.

The necessitarian and deterministic theories are of course destructive alike of personality and of religion. A God impersonal is no god in the proper meaning of the word. The beginning of all religion is the attributing of some degree of consciousness and independent intelligence and power to the Being who is worshipped. And man equally is constituted in his essential nature by similar qualities. That God should make man in His own image, and that man should make his God in likeness to humanity, are both expressions of this need to assume personality as the basis of theistic thought. And at its highest development in religion as the self-revelation of God in the soul of man the same principle is seen in fullest expression. But, against this, the necessitarian theory assumes an external order absolutely fixing the process of what, thus, only *seems* to us to be self-consciousness and volition. The Determinist theory asserts the same fixity, only that in this case it is considered as proceed-

ing not from without but from *within*, by strictly mechanical and inevitable evolution. As applied to God, this makes Him to be simply Eternal Law operating as the purely physical system of Naturalism, or as the purely logical process of Absolute Idealism. This mode of representation makes it impossible to conceive God as having any power, purpose, or moral quality that can justify any degree of personifying or worshipping from the side of man. We may admire, but do not worship, a steam-engine at work; and when a savage, for the first time seeing a train in motion, treats it as a god, it is because he in ignorance mistakenly *attributes* personal consciousness to the mysterious power. When the idea of personality—that is to say, the idea of its self-consciousness and volition—is detached from the object for him, it is no longer worshipped though it may remain a mechanical mystery.

And as applied to man there is left, by these necessitarian and determinist ideas, no room for morals or for self-knowledge. A man knows *himself* as separate from his environment, and separate from any particular limb, or from all the limbs of his body; and equally as separate from any particular thought or desire, and from any number of his thoughts and desires. But if all things constituting man operate by strict mechanical

or unalterable predetermined cause and effect, this sense of separateness is an illusion. How comes such an illusion? What force can it have? If the self with its sense of responsibility, its hope and fear, its hate and love, its energy and indolence, is only an incidental phenomenon in an aggregate of purposeless and unconscious movements of nature, the meaning at once falls away from all aspiration and effort, and from what we know as "moral" and "spiritual" character. In particular there can be no "obedience" to God even if in Eternal Law there be supposed to be a God requiring obedience. As neutralizing personality, the theories of fatalism, and of predetermined and inexorable evolution that leave no room for free-will, would obviously abolish both morality and religion.

We must recognize the reality and potency of Personal Spirit behind natural law, through the orderly processes of which the free, spontaneous, moral intelligence finds expression. The Hegelian maxim about the "truth" of freedom being *necessity*, like Tennyson's "our wills are free, *to make them Thine*," and that man is "free *to do right*" are not to be understood as necessitarian assertions. There is a moral necessity, a spiritual purpose, and a Divine order from which God Himself cannot be conceived as

deviating or allowing any portion of the Universe to deviate. And this is not less absolute but, so to speak, more absolute than the uniformity of nature as known to science. But by its very terms as moral, spiritual, and personal, this absolute order must realize itself through really free activity, through oppositions and contradictions such as are familiar to us in actual life, and such as cannot be dismissed as illusory without reducing life to chaos.

As a result, then, of our survey, we find that religion presents reality in its highest form; and that the principle of faith in the sense of a working union of the finite person with the Infinite Person is in the last resort the interpretative principle of all knowledge and all experience whatsoever. Faith emerges as at once an implicate and a constitutive: the implicate of highest reality, and the constitutive of personality as reality's ultimate expression.

So theology, in beginning with faith in God—that is, with the conceived relation of the finite person to the Infinite Person, even if it be only working towards a reality as yet in part unknown—is, nevertheless, starting from a reality that *is known.* It thus has a place as science in respect of its method, while it may advance its old claim to be queen of the sciences, and

more than a science, in respect of its universal scope.

The theological doctrine of God must proceed, then, not as inference from the philosophical idea, but on a fuller movement of personality than that involved in simply thinking. To know God, and especially to increase in knowledge of God, we must obey Him. We must voluntarily give place within us to His Spirit. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." This is the interpretation of the universe through personality, and it exhibits the movement of the finite towards the Infinite as an obedience. "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light." Nature is not mere law: it is will; it is an obedience, not to abstract principle, but to intelligent volitional personality. There are problems for thought here involved—the one and the many, necessity and freedom, how the Absolute can create a finite world without either limiting Himself by His creation, and so destroying His absoluteness, or identifying Himself with His creation and so denying to it reality and destroying man's freedom; how evil is consistent with Divine goodness, and the mechanism of nature with spirit. Yet, although thought must be encouraged to persist in its task, theology does not altogether remit these problems back to

philosophy for solution. While appropriating and stimulating the intellectual process, theology really possesses, in the principle of Personal Spirit, a completer apparatus than the purely intellectual, and finds solutions which are not less but more secure and final than those of philosophy. The personal apparatus uses faith as a chief element, but not in any sense in which faith is opposed to knowledge or implies a failure of knowledge; it is in the sense in which faith is the nexus of knowledge, and the prime constituent in all reality.

For theology there are many problems remaining unsolved, but there are none that need be abandoned as insoluble. God is not abstractly theorized upon, but accepted and received into spiritual unity with human consciousness as one of Whom, and through Whom, and unto Whom are all things.

VIII

CONCLUSION

THE matter which has been dealt with in these pages is obviously one that can neither be entered upon nor dismissed in the full detachment which is often assumed as the proper attitude in science. If there is any validity in the main contention here, then not only for theological writing but for every branch of science a personal conviction and loyalty must be assumed in the writer, and may be appealed to in the reader. It is often said that truth is its own best advocate. But, if truth is ultimately personal spirit, its advocacy is not an appeal of bare objectivity. If truth is God's message, then we have not the whole of the truth that is available for us unless we have it *as* His message and *as* a constraining faith within ourselves. To receive truth as God's message is to receive Him, and to consummate with Him a spiritual union which otherwise would not be realized.

Something like this personal covenant is, in fact, the assumption underlying the appeal to the

public which every publication makes. But philosophy, ethics, and theology, deal so directly with the relation between God and man, that for a writer on these themes to omit definite acknowledgment of the relation in his own personal attitude is to lessen considerably the reality and force of his words.

The writer, then, considers himself to have been expounding, however inadequately, a personal experience which is the ultimate and only reality of which he is conscious. This experience includes a call, peremptory, elemental, and spiritual, from the world's greatest personality, Jesus Christ. Every other personality makes its claim, but this stands out as chief. The issue of this spiritual call is effort towards developing the soul's conscious relationship to God through the perfecting of its relations with men. There is the obligation not only to be good and to do good, but to make men good, and to get good done, universally. Here is a task that appeals to the infinite in man, and it is a task that has prospect of being unflaggingly sustained and ultimately achieved only as the spirit of man makes its sincere and intimate response to the Divine call; only, that is to say, as the Infinite God is loyally given His place within the finite nature of man, and man's personality finds its home in God.

Faith is thus a discovery as well as a venture; it is not only a quest but a conquest. It is an experience that transforms and regulates every other experience by exhibiting the relation of all to God. While subject to challenge, it becomes in turn itself the greatest challenge man has to face. If God is seeking to "reveal His Son" in us, what must we do? Assuredly something different from very much that now we are doing. If man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever, to neglect or pervert this chief end is both a self-injury, and, as the individual exists in and for the social organism, it is essentially anti-social. It is here the preacher gets his leverage. His appeal is no sectional or speculative propaganda. He offers not an alternative to this world's authority, but the august and ultimate authority of God, whose wisdom and goodness are the living foundation for all authority whatsoever. Short of the religious spirit man is doing full justice neither to himself nor to his neighbour. With the religious spirit purified and progressive man at once holds the key of the future and controls the forces that are moulding the present.

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